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Introduction 
Education is one of the most important components of individual human 
capital (Becker, 1993) thus a significant determinant of wages. Indeed, the 
estimation of economic return of schooling is a relevant parameter of interest in 
economics studies and in public policy design.  
The evaluation of policies that promote education is a central research 
question. The increase in wages due to additional schooling, what is usually called 
the return to schooling, is a main component of the benefits of the proposed 
policies. In fact, to the policy maker perspective, it is crucial to understand if the 
higher wages observed for better educated people are determined only by their 
higher education level or if they reflect inherent ability differences that correlate 
with educational attainment. Therefore, treating schooling as a way to increase 
market productivity it is important to understand if any increase in public 
spending for education is meaningful for people. 
The aim of this work is to estimate the determinants of the wage function in 
Italy, focusing on the crucial role of education, taking into consideration even the 
impact of years of experience (training on the job and learning by doing 
activities), controlling for individual characteristics, and sectorial and 
geographical variables. 
The benchmark model for the development of empirical estimation of the 
returns to education is the relationship derived by Mincer (1974) between log 
hourly wages, schooling and experience. However, the empirical estimation of the 
causal returns is not an easy task because simple regressions between wage and 
schooling does not report causal returns to education (and produce biased 
estimates) as the schooling variable is likely to be endogenous due to omitted 
variable, namely ability. To overcome this problem, we apply instrumental 
variable regressions. 
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In all the chapters, the empirical analysis is carried out using a representative 
sample of Italian households, drawn from the Bank of Italy’s Survey of Household 
Income and Wealth (SHIW), for the period 1995-2012. 
In the first chapter, in line with previous literature, we find that ordinary least 
squares (OLS) under-estimate the return to schooling. Considering the 
endogeneity of schooling, the return to an additional year in school increases. In 
addition, in the period considered, the findings show that the returns to schooling 
have changed from 5.4 percent to 7.9 percent. The highest level is recorded in 
2006 and the lowest in 2012 thus the advantage to invest in education is 
decreasing in Italy. Moreover, a relative convenience to work in the public sector 
emerges as well as an evidence of a gender pay gap, in favor of men for all the 
period considered. 
Understanding how the returns estimates vary with the level of schooling 
attainment is important. Most empirical studies in this area assume log wages 
linear or quadratic in years of education and year of experience. In the second 
chapter, we remove the hypothesis of homogeneity of the return to education and 
we estimate the wage-schooling and wage-experience profile to take into account 
all the shape of these variable and their possible non-linearity. In addition, to 
analyze the effect of endogeneity on the non-monotonicity of the marginal rate of 
return to education, we use a control function approach for a semiparametric 
estimation, as suggested in Blundell and Powell (2003). Results show that the 
wage−schooling relationship is non-linear. This implies that returns to education 
depend on the level of schooling. In particular, increasing returns are evident for 
workers until 8 years of schooling (junior high school), from 1995 to 2004; 
however, in the following years they show a flat pattern. If we consider worker 
with almost 13 years of schooling (secondary school), the marginal effects across 
year continue to increase. On the other hand, decreasing returns are observed for 
workers with 18 years of schooling (tertiary education), from 2008 to 2012. 
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Several studies focused on the estimation of the average impact of schooling, 
experience and other variables on wage without investigate if they affect 
individuals differently over the wage distribution. The aim of third chapter is to 
understand if individuals in different quantile of the wage distribution are 
differently affected by these determinants. Indeed, if returns to schooling are 
heterogeneous along the wage distribution, schooling can have an impact upon 
wage inequality. In a simple human capital model, wage inequality can increase 
because returns to education and experience increase, or because residual or 
within-group inequality increases (Lemieux, 2008). In the case that returns are 
increasing from the lower to the higher end of the wage distribution, it can be 
interpreted as an indication that ability and education (or skills) are complement 
between them, and more able workers can benefit from additional investment in 
education. 
Instrumental quantile regression methods is the appropriate tool to describe 
the impact of education on wages distribution, controlling for unobserved 
heterogeneity and endogeneity. Our results show that, while returns to education 
are positive everywhere, there exists a large degree of heterogeneity in returns to 
education across the wage distribution. In particular, gains are higher for 
individuals in the upper tail of the wages distribution than for those in the lower 
tail. This means that education have an inequality-increasing effect over time, 
because individuals with high ability, those at the upper quantile of the wage 
distribution, seem to benefit more from formal education. Therefore, the results 
suggest that the impact of education on the distribution of wages depends on the 
initial distribution of ability across population and, consequently, formal 
education does not compensate for differences in innate abilities and early life 
conditions. 
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Chapter 1 
 
An Estimate of the Wage Function in 
Italy 
 
 
 
 
 
Abstract. Education can be seen as an investment with returns 
incorporates in the future wages. The general model points out that 
higher individual education implies higher individual wages. 
Many studies have tested this relationship, in different countries. 
Using data come from the 1995 to 2012 waves of the Bank of 
Italy’s Survey of Household Income and Wealth, we estimate the 
determinants of the wage function, focusing on the role of 
schooling and labor market experience. 
The findings highlight the evidence of returns to schooling that 
have changed over the period considered and are between 5.4 
percent and 7.9 percent, recording the highest level for 2006 and 
the lowest in 2012. Therefore, the advantage to invest in education 
is decreasing in Italy. Moreover, a relative convenience to work in 
the public sector emerges. Finally, there is evidence of a gender 
pay gap, in favor of men for all the period considered.  
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1.1 Introduction 
Education is one of the most important components of individual human 
capital (Becker, 1993) thus a significant determinant of wages. The estimation of 
the economic return to education has been one of the predominant areas of 
analysis in applied economics for over 50 years, in both micro and 
macroeconomics.  
The analysis of education has been driven by the concept of human capital, 
pioneered in the works of led economist such as Gary Becker, Jacob Mincer and 
Theodore Schultz. According the human capital theory, education is seen as an 
investment of current resources to get future returns.  
The estimation of economic return of schooling is a relevant parameter of 
interest in economics studies and in public policy design. Indeed, a huge body of 
literature focus in the estimation of returns to education. This interest is due by 
the link between schooling and productivity growth (Lucas, 1988). Moreover, 
economists studying inequality and poverty seek to learn how schooling increases 
the incomes of the poor. Therefore, the evaluation of policies that promote 
education is a central research question.  
The increase in wages due to additional schooling, what is usually called the 
return to schooling, is a main component of the benefits of the proposed policies. 
In fact, to the policy maker perspective, it is crucial to understand if the higher 
wages observed for better educated people are determined only by their higher 
education level or if they reflect inherent ability differences that correlate with 
educational attainment. Therefore, treating schooling as a way to increase market 
productivity it is important to understand if any increase in public spending for 
education is meaningful for people. 
The benchmark model for the development of empirical estimation of the 
returns to education is the relationship derived by Mincer (1974) between log 
hourly wages, schooling and experience. The original Mincer equation assumes 
linear effect on wages of each year of education regardless of the attainment level. 
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Since the pioneer work of Mincer (1974) who has written the methodological 
foundation to estimate wage equations, a huge body of works were dedicated to 
finding the causal return to education. The causal return to education is the extra 
amount of wage that a randomly selected worker receives from an additional year 
of education. As explained before, knowing the causal return is important for 
policy makers, because it directly informs about the utility of educational 
programs in terms of monetary payoffs for its beneficiaries and for the economic 
system at all. However, the empirical estimation of the causal returns is not an 
easy task i.e. the simple regressions between wage and schooling does not report 
causal returns to education (and produce biased estimates) as the schooling 
variable is likely to be endogenous due to omitted variable, namely ability.  
One well-established route to circumvent the endogeneity problem is to use 
instrument variable (IV) methods. These methods, while theoretically appealing, 
are not easy to implement in practice as they rely on the availability of valid and 
significant instruments. 
The research question of this chapter is to investigate how years of education, 
experience and other variables affect wages in Italy. In addition, we want 
understand if the impact of these variables on wages vary over time.  
Since education can be seen as a private decision to invest in human capital, 
we calculate the internal rate of return to this private investment. Moreover, we 
take into account differential effects of different educational level: vocational, 
upper-secondary and tertiary education. The data come from  the Survey of 
Household Income and Wealth (SHIW) carried out by the Bank of Italy, covering 
the period from 1995 to 2012 where information about education, wage and 
demographics characteristics are collected at individual and household level.  
Our results shows that returns to education have changed over the considered 
period, varying between 5.4 percent and 7.9 percent. Considering different sector 
of employment, a relative convenience to work in the public sector emerges. In 
addition, there is an evidence of a gender pay gap, in favor of men for all the 
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period considered. When the kind of school attended is taken into consideration, 
the returns to education increase with higher levels of educational attainment. 
The reminder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the 
theoretical background of the wages equation to be estimated. Section 3 describes 
the dataset used in the empirical estimation and the characteristics of the sample. 
Section 4 reports the estimates of the effect of schooling, experience and other 
variables on wages. Finally, section 5 summarizes and concludes. 
 
 
1.2 Theoretical Framework for the Empirical Analysis 
The theoretical framework underlying most empirical studies on the 
determinants of wages, and the related estimate of the return to schooling, is the 
model of accumulation of human capital developed by Schultz (1961), Becker 
(1962) and Mincer (1958, 1974). In particular, Mincer (1974) focuses on the life-
cycle dynamics of earnings and on the relationship between (observed) earnings, 
earnings capacity (proportional to the individual stock of human capital) and 
investment in earnings capacity (human capital); such investments can regard 
both formal schooling and on-the-job training (learning by doing).  
Earnings will be a function of earnings capacity net of the costs of investment 
in earnings capacity. In particular, let 𝐸𝑡 be the earnings capacity at time t. 
Earnings capacity can be increased by investment in human capital. To maintain 
as simple as possible the analysis, investments are expressed as a fraction of 
earnings capacity: 
𝐶𝑡 = 𝑘𝑡𝐸𝑡, (1.1) 
where 𝑘𝑡 is the fraction of earnings capacity invested at time t. Let 𝜌𝑡 be the return 
on investments made at time t. Then: 
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𝐸𝑡+1 = 𝐸𝑡 + 𝐶𝑡𝜌𝑡 − 𝛿𝑡𝐸𝑡 = 𝐸𝑡(1 + 𝑘𝑡𝜌𝑡) − 𝛿𝑡𝐸𝑡 , (1.2) 
where 𝛿𝑡 is the depreciation on obsolescence of earnings capacity (see Rosen, 
1974). Recursive substitution yields: 
𝐸𝑡 = ∏ (1 + 𝜌𝑗𝑘𝑗 − 𝛿𝑡)𝐸0
𝑡−1
𝑗=0 , (1.3) 
where 𝐸0 is the earnings capacity, independent of schooling and experience. 
Formal schooling is defined as the numbers of years spent in full-time 
investment (𝑘𝑡 = 1). Assume that the rate of return on formal schooling of length 
s is constant for all years of schooling and equal to 𝜌𝑠 and that formal schooling 
takes place at the beginning of life, i.e. 𝜌𝑡 = 𝜌𝑠 ∀ 𝑡 = 0, … , 𝑠. Therefore, assume 
that the rate of return to post-school investment is constant over time and equals 
𝜌𝑝𝑠, i.e. 𝜌𝑡 = 𝜌𝑝𝑠 ∀ 𝑡 ≥ 𝑠. Then, we can write: 
ln 𝐸𝑡 = ln 𝐸0 + 𝑠 ln(1 + 𝜌𝑠) + ∑ ln(1 + 𝜌𝑝𝑠𝑘𝑗 − 𝛿𝑡)
𝑡−1
𝑗=𝑠 , (1.4) 
which yields the approximate relationship (for small 𝜌𝑠 and 𝜌𝑝𝑠)
1: 
ln 𝐸𝑡 ≈ ln 𝐸0 + 𝜌𝑠𝑠 + 𝜌𝑝𝑠 ∑ 𝑘𝑗 − ∑ 𝛿𝑗
𝑡−1
𝑗=𝑠
𝑡−1
𝑗=𝑠 . (1.5) 
To establish a relationship between earnings capacity and years of 
experience, Mincer (1974) approximates the Ben-Porath (1967) model and further 
assumes a linearly declining rate of post-school investment in human capital: 
𝑘𝑠+𝑥 = 𝜅 (1 −
𝑥
𝑇
), (1.6) 
where 𝜅 > 0 is a scale parameter, 𝑥 = 𝑡 − 𝑠 ≥ 0 is the amount of work 
experience as of age t. The length of working life, 𝑇, is assumed to be independent 
of years of schooling2. Given Equation (1.6), the relationship between earnings 
capacity, schooling and experience is given by: 
                                                          
1 See pag.19 of Mincer (1974). 
2 This means that educated workers retire after not educated workers. 
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ln 𝐸𝑥+𝑠 ≈ ln 𝐸0 − 𝜅𝜌𝑝𝑠 + 𝜌𝑠𝑠 + 𝜌𝑝𝑠𝜅𝑥 (1 +
1
2𝑇
) −
𝜌𝑝𝑠𝜅
2𝑇
𝑥2 − 𝑥𝛿, (1.7) 
under the assumption that 𝛿𝑗 = 𝛿  ∀ 𝑗. Observed earnings are equal to earnings 
capacity less investment costs, i.e. 𝑤(𝑠, 𝑥) = (1 − 𝑘𝑠+𝑥)𝐸𝑥+𝑠. Therefore: 
ln 𝑤(𝑠, 𝑥) ≈ ln 𝐸𝑥+𝑠 − 𝜅 (1 −
𝑥
𝑇
)= 
=  ln 𝐸0 − 𝜅𝜌𝑝𝑠 − 𝜅 + 𝜌𝑠𝑠 + [𝜅 (𝜌𝑝𝑠 +
𝜌𝑝𝑠
2𝑇
+
1
𝑇
) − 𝛿] 𝑥 −
𝜌𝑝𝑠𝜅
2𝑇
𝑥2= 
= 𝛼0 + 𝜌𝑠𝑠 + 𝛽0𝑥 + 𝛽1𝑥
2, (1.8) 
where 𝛼0 = ln 𝐸0 − 𝜅(1 + 𝜌𝑝𝑠),    𝛽0 = 𝜅 [𝜌𝑝𝑠 (1 +
1
2𝑇
) +
1
𝑇
] − 𝛿,   𝛽1 = −
𝜌𝑝𝑠𝜅
2𝑇
.  
Starting from this standard form of the Mincer wages model, it is possible to 
derive an econometrics model in order to estimate the parameters. Therefore, the 
log wages are regressed on a constant term, a linear term in years of schooling, 
and linear and quadratic term in years of labor market experience. In most of 
applications of the Mincer model, it is assumed that the intercept and slope 
coefficients are identical across persons. This implicitly assumes that 𝐸0, 𝜅, 𝜌𝑠 , 
𝜌𝑝𝑠 and 𝛿 are the same across workers and do not depend on the schooling level. 
However, Mincer formulates a more general model that allows for the possibility 
that 𝐸0, 𝜅, 𝜌𝑠, 𝜌𝑝𝑠 and 𝛿 differ across workers, which produces a random 
coefficient model: 
ln 𝑤(𝑠𝑖 , 𝑥𝑖) = 𝛼0𝑖 + 𝜌𝑠𝑖𝑠𝑖 + 𝛽0𝑖𝑥𝑖 + 𝛽1𝑖𝑥𝑖
2. (1.9) 
Denoting 𝛼0 = 𝐸(𝛼0𝑖), 𝜌𝑠 = 𝐸(𝜌𝑠𝑖), 𝛽0 = 𝐸(𝛽0𝑖), 𝛽1 = 𝐸(𝛽1𝑖), we can 
rewrite Equation (1.9) as: 
ln 𝑤(𝑠𝑖 , 𝑥𝑖) = 𝜌𝑠𝑠𝑖 + 𝛽0𝑥𝑖 + 𝛽1𝑥𝑖
2 + [𝛼0𝑖 + (𝜌𝑠𝑖 − 𝜌𝑠)𝑠𝑖 +
(𝛽0𝑖 − 𝛽0)𝑥𝑖 + (𝛽1𝑖 − 𝛽1)𝑥𝑖
2], (1.10) 
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where the terms in brackets are part of the error. Mincer assumes that 
𝛼0𝑖 , (𝜌𝑠𝑖 − 𝜌𝑠), (𝛽0𝑖 − 𝛽0), (𝛽1𝑖 − 𝛽1) are independent of (𝑠𝑖 , 𝑥𝑖) which reduces 
Equation (1.10) to Equation (1.8) in terms of estimations with individual data, i.e: 
ln 𝑤(𝑠𝑖 , 𝑥𝑖) = 𝛼0𝑖 + 𝜌𝑠𝑠𝑖 + 𝛽0𝑥𝑖 + 𝛽1𝑥𝑖
2 + 𝜀𝑖. (1.11) 
That is the Mincerian wage equation where 𝜀𝑖 is a mean zero residual with 
𝐸(𝜀𝑖|𝑠𝑖 , 𝑥𝑖) = 0 
Mincer derives several implications from the accounting identity model 
under different assumptions about the relationship between formal schooling and 
post-school investment patterns. Under the assumption that post-school 
investment 𝜌𝑝𝑠 are identical across persons and do not depend on the schooling 
level s, we have that 
𝜕 ln 𝑤(𝑠𝑖,𝑥𝑖)
𝜕𝑠𝑖𝜕𝑥𝑖
= 0 and 
𝜕 ln 𝑤(𝑠𝑖,𝑥𝑖)
𝜕𝑠𝑖𝜕𝑡
=
𝜌𝑝𝑠𝜅
𝑇
> 0. These two 
conditions imply: 
(i) log-wages experience profiles are parallel across schooling levels; 
(ii) log-wages age profile diverge with age across schooling levels. 
Equation (1.10) highlights how error term 𝜀𝑖 captures unobservable 
individual effects, as unobserved ability; this also influences schooling decision 
s, and thus induces a correlation between schooling and the error term in the wages 
function. With endogeneity, the estimation of the return to schooling by ordinary 
least squares is biased. In literature, the problem has been addressed in different 
ways. The measures of ability have been incorporated with a proxy variable for 
unobserved effects, in order to control separately the effect of education and 
ability (Mendolicchio, 2006). Another solution is to apply within-twins 
differences in wages and education, assuming that unobserved effects are additive 
and common within twins so they can be differentiated out by regressing the wage 
difference within twins against their education differences (Bonjour et al., 2003). 
An additional approach deals with the simultaneous relationship between 
schooling and wages by specifying a two-equation system, which is identified by 
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exploiting instrumental variables that affect s but not w (Blundell, Dearden and 
Sianesi, 2001), where family background is used as instruments for schooling. 
The last approach is the most applied in the literature and will be our strategy to 
deal with endogeneity. 
 
 
1.3 Data and Sources 
The analysis is based on data drawn from the Bank of Italy’s Survey of 
Household Income and Wealth (SHIW), which reports several socio-economic 
characteristics of Italian households.  
The SHIW is a biannual survey on Italian families with a sample of 
approximately 8,000 household per year. From 1995 to 2012 observations from 
nine subsequent surveys are available. In particular, the SHIW contains 
information both on households (family composition) and on individuals. 
Moreover, it provides detailed information on several characteristics of workers 
within each household, such as their net yearly wages, average weekly hours of 
work and number of months of employment per year, educational attainment (the 
highest completed school degree), job experience, gender, marital status, sector 
of employment, household composition, parents background, regions of 
residence, and town size. 
We consider a sub-sample of men and women between 15-64 years old, full 
time and part time employees, working either in the public or in the private sector 
and such that information about wages are available. In the analysis, we exclude 
self-employed because of the low reliability of their declared earnings. As 
discussed by Brandolini and Cannari (1994), SHIW seems to underestimate the 
self-employed earnings of about 50 percentage points. 
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1.3.1   Variables Used in the Analysis 
As shown by Equation (1.11), wages, schooling attainment, and working 
experience of each individual are the key variables in the estimate of Mincer 
equation. 
Mincer equation refers to the (log of) hourly price of labor as the correct 
measure of worker’s wages (LOGY_H), and, indeed, this is the measure used by 
most empirical studies3 (Brunello and Miniaci, 1999; Blundell, Dearden and 
Sianesi, 2005; Ciccone, Cingano and Cipollone, 2006). SHIW contains yearly net 
wages of taxes and social security contributions. Additional information on the 
average number of hours worked per week and on the number of months worked 
per year, can be used to estimate the hourly net wage, which is calculated by 
yearly net wages divided by months worked multiplied by hours worked each 
month. 
Schooling attainment (SCHOOL) is generally measured by the number of 
years spent at school. SHIW does not contain information about this number of 
years, but only on the highest degree attained by individuals. Following a common 
approach in literature (Vieira, 1999; Brunello and Miniaci, 1999) we calculate the 
educational attainment of the individual by imputing the number of years required 
to complete her/his reported maximum level of educational attainment4. More 
precisely, we consider that the (statutory) numbers of years required to obtain a 
primary and a junior school certificate is 5 and 8 years respectively; instead, for 
the upper secondary school the number of years ranges from 11 (vocational or 
technical school) to 13 (classical or scientific studies); finally, for tertiary 
education, we consider 16, 18 and 21 years for the university diploma, the college 
degree, and the postgraduate degree (e.g. Ph.D.) respectively. In the analysis of 
Section 1.4.2, we will also treat education as a categorical variable divided into 4 
                                                          
3 Hourly wages can be affected by measurement errors because we calculate them as total wages 
divided by hours of work. 
4 Standard and not actual years of formal schooling are recorded. Since students who fail to reach 
a standard have to repeat the year, the actual number of years is likely to be underestimated. 
13 
 
categories: no education or primary school or junior high school 
(COMP_SCHOOL), 3-year vocational school (VOCATIONAL), upper 
secondary school (UPPER SECONDARY), tertiary education (TERTIARY; 
including university diploma, college and post-graduate education). It is 
important to remark that in Italy the statutory number of years can be significantly 
different from the actual number of years spent to obtain a degree, especially at 
college because of the high percentage of irregular student. 
Many empirical studies use age as a proxy for the (working) experience of 
individuals. But this choice can be severely biased, especially for young cohorts. 
Other authors use potential experience, defined as the difference between the 
current age and the age at the labor market entry, but they ignore the possibility 
of unemployment or underemployment, again a crucial feature for young cohorts. 
In this work, we use as proxy for experience (EXPERIENCE), the number of 
years for which a worker has been paid social security contribution; they should 
reflect the effective years of training on the job and learning-by-doing activities. 
We introduce several control variables in the analysis to account for 
individual characteristics and for differences in the labor market. A gender 
dummy (DUMMY_MALE) controls for different wage levels between men and 
women. Marital status also enter into the analysis as a dummy variable 
(DUMMY_MARRIED) taking the value 1 if the person is formally married, 0 
otherwise. Part-time work is captured through a separate dummy variable 
(DUMMY_PART_TIME), since the assumption that each working hour makes 
the same contribution to weekly wages (constancy of the hourly wage) cannot 
hold across workers with different time status (part time versus full time).  
In addition, controls are introduced for family composition, as a proxy for 
the influence of housework, particularly important in the female labor supply 
(Heckman and Killingsworth, 1986). We control for the number of components 
of the family (NCOMP) and for the fact that the individual is the head of his/her 
household (DUMMY_HOUSEHOLD). 
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Table 1.1 - Means and standard deviations of the variables used in the empirical analysis 
for the entire sample (1995, 1998, 2000, 2002, 2004, 2006, 2008, 2010, 2012) 
Variable Mean S. d. Description 
LOGY_H 2,265 0,438 Logarithm of the hourly wages less tax 
SCHOOL 11,373 3,800 
Schooling attainment, that is the 
number of years spent at school 
COMP_SCHOOL 0,383 0,486 
Compulsory school: no schooling, 
primary school and junior high school 
VOCATIONAL 0,090 0,288 3-years Vocational degree 
UPPER_SECONDARY 0,379 0,485 Upper secondary degree 
TERTIARY 0,146 0,354 Tertiary degree 
EXPERIENCE 17,683 10,673 
Number of years for which it has been 
paid social security contributions, as a 
proxy for years of training on the job 
DUMMY_MALE 0,578 0,494 Gender dummy 
DUMMY_MARRIED 0,647 0,478 Dummy variable for marital status 
NCOMP 3,329 1,185 Number of components of the family 
DUMMY_HOUSEHOLD 0,475 0,499 
Household dummy, that is equal to 1 if 
the individual is the household of the 
family 
DUMMY_PART_TIME 0,094 0,292 Dummy variable for part time work 
DUMMY_AGRICULTURAL 0,034 0,180 
Dummy variable for agricultural 
sector 
DUMMY_INDUSTRIAL 0,312 0,463 Dummy variable for industrial sector 
DUMMY_PUBLIC 0,320 0,466 
Dummy variable for public 
administration sector 
DUMMY_OTHER_SECTOR 0,335 0,472 Dummy variable for other sector 
DUMMY_TOWN 0,083 0,275 
Dummy variable for the town of 
residence that has more than 500.000 
inhabitants 
DUMMY_NORTH 0,501 0,500 Dummy variable for North regions 
DUMMY_CENTER 0,214 0,410 Dummy variable for Center regions 
DUMMY_SOUTH 0,286 0,452 Dummy variable for South regions 
DUMMY_SETT_GEN 0,374 0,484 
Dummy variable equal to 1 if the 
individual works in the same sector of 
the father and/or of the mother 
SCHOOL_F 6,094 4,094 
Schooling attainment of the father's 
worker 
SCHOOL_M 5,346 3,711 
Schooling attainment of the mother's 
worker 
 
Controls for sector (DUMMY_AGRICULTURAL for the agricultural 
sector, DUMMY_INDUSTRIAL for the industrial sector, DUMMY_PUBLIC for 
the public sector and DUMMY_OTHER_SECTOR for other sector different from 
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the previous ones) should capture potential factor from the demand side of labor 
market (e.g. imperfectly competitive labor markets). In the same light, we add 
some controls for the geographical area of residence: one dummy for the town of 
residence that has more than 500.000 inhabitants (DUMMY_TOWN), and three 
different dummies for the Italian macro-regions: North, Center and South 
(DUMMY_NORTH, DUMMY_CENTER and DUMMY_SOUTH)5.  
Table 1.1 reports some descriptive statistics of the main variables used in the 
empirical analysis for all the waves (wages are expressed in euro 2012). 
 
 
1.4   Estimates 
In a first model, we consider schooling as measured by the years of 
schooling. In a second step of analysis, we consider separately different level of 
educational attainment. 
 
1.4.1 Mincer Wage Model with Years of Education 
For each available wave, we estimate the Mincer wage model reported in 
Equation (1.11). However, as discussed in a very large literature reviewed by Card 
(1995), OLS estimation of the returns to education via Mincer wage Equation are 
not consistent either because of i) the measurement errors in the schooling 
variable, and ii) the endogeneity bias of schooling. 
In particular, the measurement of years of schooling in our data is exposed 
to error because it is possible to observe only the last completed degree. However, 
individuals with the same completed degree could have spent a significantly 
                                                          
5 Card and Krueger (1992) showed how students who grew up in states with better quality schools 
acquire more education. Moreover, the place of residence is linked to the possibility to find a job and be 
well-paid. 
16 
 
different number of years in education. Moreover, the endogeneity bias arise 
either from unobserved differences in the individual ability or from a general 
unobserved heterogeneity. Indeed, if individual with higher education have 
greater ability than others, the estimated return to education is biased upwards 
since part of the productivity differential is due to their ability or to other skills 
acquired outside the school (ability bias). Thus, the ability bias interacts with 
heterogeneous subjective discount rates that result in under-estimating the true 
effect of schooling on wages when workers with lower education are the more 
able ones (heterogeneity bias). The total effect of the bias in the OLS estimates is 
ambiguous. 
One way to deal with measurement errors and the endogeneity of schooling 
is to estimate the Equation (1.11) by using instrumental variables (IV). The 
identification of a valid instrument is not an easy task and it has been reviewed 
among others by Card (1999) and Ashenfelter, Harmon and Oosterbeek (1999). 
The requirements for an instruments to be valid are that it should be correlated 
with educational choice but not correlated (with the log of) wages conditional on 
schooling (Wooldridge, 2012).  
There is a long tradition in using family background variables, typically the 
level of parent’s schooling, as a valid instruments (Cannari and D’Alessio, 1995; 
Colussi, 1997; Card, 1999). The idea is based on the observation of persistence 
across generation about the level of schooling and it is theoretically justified by 
involuntary transmission of human capital. Some previous articles on returns to 
education in Italy derived instrumental variables in the SHIW data, exploiting 
information provided by the school reforms of the 1960s (Brunello and Miniaci, 
1999). However, this type of instrumental variables becomes much less 
convincing when the focus of the analysis is the time dynamics of return to 
education. Since the effects of school reforms change according to the population 
sub-group involved in the reforms, the group of people affected by the instruments 
changes over time, affecting in turn dynamic comparison of the estimates. 
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Our instruments will be a set of variables that measure family background, 
including the highest completed educational level by the father and the mother of 
the respondents. More educated parents are likely to value education more and to 
fill better jobs. Furthermore, early educational investment decisions are usually 
taken not by the individual him/herself, but rather by other agents such as the 
parents. The assumption is that not only the level and also the kind of education 
owned by the parents affects the children’s one, both through direct decisions, 
when children are young, and indirect decisions, by encouraging a certain career 
over another. Checchi, Ichino, Rustichini (1999) show that students choose the 
level and kind of education not only in relation to their previous curricula but also 
according to the level and type of education of their parents. 
In our estimation strategy, the instruments validity are tested by computing 
Sargan test, which is an over-identification test with an asymptotic χ² distribution 
and degrees of freedom equal to the number of over-identifying restrictions. The 
test verifies whether the instruments play a direct role, through predicting 
educational attainment (Wooldridge, 2012). An important requirement is also that 
selected instrument should be correlated with the endogenous variable and to test 
for this, as suggested by Bound et al. (1995)6, in the first-stage regression of the 
endogenous variable we compute the F-statistic on the excluded instruments. The 
F-test on excluded variables shows that our set of instruments is valid, meaning 
that instruments play a significant role in the reduced form for education and it 
explains a substantial share of variation in education. Hence, the condition for a 
valid instrument is satisfied. 
 
 
 
                                                          
6 If the instruments are weakly correlated with the endogenous variable, this is likely to produce 
estimates with large standard errors. In particular, if the correlation between the instrument and the 
endogenous explanatory variable is weak, then even a small correlation between the instrument and the 
error can produce a larger inconsistency in the IV estimate of the coefficients than in the OLS estimates. 
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Table 1.2 - IV estimates7. Dependent Variable: log of hourly wages less tax. Omitted categories 
are: Center (DUMMY_CENTER); Industrial sector (DUMMY_INDUSTRIAL). 
VARIABLES 1995 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 
          
SCHOOL 0.0643*** 0.0619*** 0.0687*** 0.0712*** 0.0668*** 0.0786*** 0.0587*** 0.0685*** 0.0542*** 
 (0.00368) (0.00764) (0.00475) (0.00760) (0.00678) (0.00621) (0.00613) (0.00784) (0.00813) 
EXPERIENCE 0.0189*** 0.0188*** 0.0209*** 0.0246*** 0.0144*** 0.0250*** 0.0226*** 0.0151*** 0.0169*** 
 (0.00331) (0.00671) (0.00354) (0.00530) (0.00450) (0.00375) (0.00447) (0.00439) (0.00435) 
EXPERIENCE^2 -0.000142* -0.000142 -0.000199** -0.000278** -0.000149 -0.000326*** -0.000270** -4.20e-05 -7.98e-05 
 (7.92e-05) (0.000155) (8.13e-05) (0.000128) (0.000115) (9.04e-05) (0.000112) (0.000100) (0.000100) 
DUMMY_MALE 0.132*** 0.114*** 0.0967*** 0.0984*** 0.0812*** 0.109*** 0.156*** 0.154*** 0.101*** 
 (0.0250) (0.0354) (0.0186) (0.0253) (0.0261) (0.0210) (0.0215) (0.0266) (0.0232) 
DUMMY_MARRIED 0.00438 0.0501 0.0562** 0.00849 0.0369 -0.00942 -0.0498* 0.0292 0.00841 
 (0.0249) (0.0448) (0.0251) (0.0382) (0.0317) (0.0235) (0.0279) (0.0283) (0.0326) 
NCOMP 0.0177** 0.0150 -0.00134 0.00120 -0.00221 0.0315*** 0.0277*** -0.00232 0.0210* 
 (0.00728) (0.0146) (0.00777) (0.0101) (0.00898) (0.00896) (0.00893) (0.0110) (0.0117) 
DUMMY_HOUSEHOLD -0.00637 -0.00124 0.00590 0.0225 0.0188 0.0306 0.00893   
 (0.0254) (0.0369) (0.0184) (0.0247) (0.0245) (0.0200) (0.0237)   
DUMMY_TOWN 0.00582 0.0310 0.0126 -0.0814** -0.0184 0.0423* 0.0164 -0.0339 -0.00380 
 (0.0210) (0.0405) (0.0215) (0.0360) (0.0447) (0.0242) (0.0305) (0.0395) (0.0407) 
DUMMY_NORTH 0.0378** 0.0671** 0.0459*** 0.0455* 0.0667** -0.00831 -0.00197 0.0514* 0.0404 
 (0.0167) (0.0286) (0.0171) (0.0238) (0.0297) (0.0193) (0.0230) (0.0288) (0.0273) 
DUMMY_SOUTH -0.0239 0.0635** -0.00599 0.00619 0.0224 -0.0493** -0.0344 0.0201 -0.00710 
 (0.0185) (0.0319) (0.0224) (0.0280) (0.0353) (0.0230) (0.0254) (0.0316) (0.0340) 
DUMMY_AGRICULTURAL -0.0394 0.0209 -0.116* -0.0404 -0.0661 -0.127* -0.0606 0.0278 -0.102* 
 (0.0703) (0.104) (0.0629) (0.0578) (0.0435) (0.0742) (0.0481) (0.0692) (0.0574) 
DUMMY_PUBLIC 0.109*** 0.0435 0.0199 0.00801 0.0525* 0.0100 0.0947*** 0.0677* 0.0689* 
 (0.0218) (0.0343) (0.0216) (0.0314) (0.0311) (0.0290) (0.0288) (0.0356) (0.0400) 
DUMMY_OTHER_SECTOR 0.0156 -0.00728 -0.00811 -0.0140 -0.0144 -0.0299 -0.00180 0.00405 -0.0520** 
 (0.0179) (0.0397) (0.0196) (0.0232) (0.0263) (0.0204) (0.0235) (0.0265) (0.0252) 
DUMMY_SECT_PARENTS -0.00735 0.0423* -0.0131 -0.00227 -0.0113 -0.0150 0.0307* 0.00793 -0.0157 
 (0.0182) (0.0250) (0.0151) (0.0186) (0.0188) (0.0172) (0.0186) (0.0224) (0.0236) 
DUMMY_PART_TIME 0.0387 0.0781 0.0826** -0.0605 -0.0123 0.0191 0.0131 0.0444 -0.0191 
 (0.0360) (0.0651) (0.0322) (0.0444) (0.0385) (0.0415) (0.0366) (0.0333) (0.0348) 
          
Constant 1.130*** 1.085*** 1.112*** 1.088*** 1.240*** 0.980*** 1.172*** 1.082*** 1.209*** 
 (0.0596) (0.132) (0.0692) (0.0939) (0.0854) (0.0879) (0.0877) (0.112) (0.110) 
          
Observations 4,352 1,468 3,783 3,321 3,405 3,437 2,836 2,145 2,112 
R-squared 0.403 0.308 0.294 0.261 0.206 0.267 0.331 0.250 0.302 
Robust standard errors in parenthesis 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Table 1.2 presents the IV estimates for the period 1995-20128. The Sargan test 
never rejects the null hypothesis of no miss specification (see the first stage 
estimation and all the tests in the appendix A), so we cannot reject the validity of 
over-identifying restrictions. In addition, the Bound test always rejects the null 
hypothesis of no correlation between education and additional instruments.  
We confirm for this sample the finding that the estimated returns to education 
are significantly larger with IV than with OLS, as stressed by large part of the 
                                                          
7 In the SHIW waves, information about family background is available only for the households 
and for his/her spouse or cohabitant. For year 2008 for the households and for his/her spouse or 
cohabitant if the households is borne in an odd year, while for year 2010 and year 2012 only for the 
households. 
8 We also estimate return to education by applying OLS (the results are showed in the Appendix 
A). Consistent with the existing literature, we find large positive returns to education after instrumenting 
for education; the two-stage least squares estimates are much larger than their OLS counterparts. OLS 
approach, failing to address endogeneity and measurement errors problems consistently underestimates 
the returns to education. IV estimates are generally 20–40% above their OLS counterpart (Trostel et al., 
2002). 
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international literature. The downward OLS bias implied by IV estimates could 
arise from the attenuation effect of a measurement error in the schooling variables, 
but also a distortion from omission of the variable “ability” could lead to a similar 
result. This means that the more “able” (in terms of capacity to earn higher wages) 
individuals have lower preference for schooling, and those preferences could be 
justified by the higher opportunity costs faced by the “able” individuals.  
 
 
1.4.1.1 The Return on Schooling 
The main features of empirical research on returns to education in Italy are 
shown in Table 1.3. The estimated rate of return to an additional year of schooling 
vary across studies, also for the method used in the estimate. Antonelli (1985), 
who consider regional data, estimates that an additional year of schooling 
increases annual net wages by 4.6 percent. Cannari et al. (1989) use a larger 
sample from the 1986 wave of the Bank of Italy, finding a similar result of a return 
around 4 per cent. While Lucifora and Reilly (1990) estimate the mincerian wages 
function using the ENI special survey on earning and they find that the marginal 
return to schooling is slightly higher for women than for men but again around 4 
percent. 
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Table 1.3 – A summary of the estimated rates of return to schooling of an additional year of 
schooling in Italy 
Author 
Method of 
Estimation 
        Years 
Estimated Rates of Return to 
Schooling (%) 
Antonelli (1985) OLS 1977 4.6 
Cannari, Pellegrini, and Sestito (1989) OLS 1986 4.0 
Lucifora and Reilly (1990) OLS 1985 3.6 (men) 4.0 (women) 
Cannari and D'Alessio (1995) IV 1993 7.0 
Colussi (1997) IV 1993 7.6 
Flabbi (1997) IV 1991 6.2 (men) 5.6 (women) 
Brunello and Miniaci (1999) IV 1993 and 1995 5.7 
Brunello, Comi, and Lucifera (2000) OLS 1995 6.2 (men) 7.7 (women) 
Ciccone (2004) OLS 1987-2000 6.1 
Ciccone, Cingano, and Cipollone (2006) OLS 1987-2000 6.9 
Mendolicchio (2006) PV 2002 5.3 (men) 6.5 (women) 
Cingano and Cipollone (2009) OLS 1987-2000 6.0 
 
 
For the 1993 wave of Bank of Italy Cannari and D’Alessio (1995), using 
family background variables as instruments of educational outcomes, find that the 
marginal return to education is around 7 percent, much higher than previous 
results. Also Colussi (1997) obtain a similar result, using the same wave and a 
similar set of instruments. For 1991 wave, Flabbi (1997) calculates the returns to 
education separately for men and women with an instrumental variable approach 
based upon the identification of exogenous changes in the schooling system; he 
finds that the marginal effect of education is 6.2 percent for men and 5.6 percent 
for women, confirming the gender gap in wages. For  the 1993 and 1995 waves, 
Brunello and Miniaci (1999) estimate a return to education equal to 5.7 percent 
(taking into account the endogeneity of schooling). The estimated coefficient on 
the mincerian rate of return to schooling is around 6 percent in Ciccone (2004) 
and Cingano and Cipollone (2009). 
Brunello, Comi and Lucifora (2000) find evidence of a greater return to 
schooling for women, that is also confirmed in the work of Mendolicchio (2006), 
in which proxy variables approach is applied to deal with the endogeneity of the 
schooling variable.  
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In our results from the estimations of the Mincerian wage equation, the 
evidence is that returns have changed over the period considered. The estimations 
of the returns to schooling are between 5.4 percent and 7.9 percent, recording the 
highest level in 2006 and the lowest in 2012, and on average the rate of return to 
schooling is equal to 6.6 percent. Looking at the previous estimates made for Italy, 
as shown in Figure 1.1, we can notice that our estimate are in line with the 
literature. Moreover, from 1995 to 2012, it is not present a clear patterns of the 
return to schooling, either increasing or decreasing. 
 
Figure 1.1 - Estimates of the Return to Education, 1995-2012 (with confidence intervals at 95%) 
 
 
 
1.4.1.2 The Return on Experience  
The dynamics of experience is drawn in Figure 1.2. We observe different 
pattern for each year of the sample: from 1995 to 2008 the experience profile is a 
concave function, more or less steeper, while in 2010 it is approximately a linear 
function. Therefore, we can affirm that the experience profile is not linear function 
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(except for 2010 and 2012) and that the estimates are quite stable over the time 
period considered. 
 
Figure 1.2 - Estimates of the Experience Profile, 1995-2012 
 
 
 
1.4.1.3 The Impact of Other Variables 
If we consider the DUMMY_MALE variable, we observe a strong evidence 
of a gender pay gap, in favor of men for all the period considered, with an 
increasing trend, from 13.2 percent in 1995 to 15.4 percent in 2010 and to 10.1 in 
2012. 
Considering the geographical residence of the workers and the sector of 
employment, differences in estimates mainly reflect territorial and sectorial 
performance of Italy.  
The DUMMY_NORTH is positive while the DUMMY_SOUTH in 
negative. This means that it is more convenient to work in the north regions in 
comparison to the central regions, instead if an individual works in the south 
region he will earns less than in the center regions. Therefore, working in the same 
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sector of the father or the mother (DUMMY_SECT_PARENTS) seems to not 
bring particular benefits, except for year 1998 and 2008 where this dummy is 
significant and positive. 
Finally, considering different sector of employment, working in the 
agricultural sector is less convenient than working in the industrial sector. On the 
contrary, working in the public sector is more convenient than working in the 
industrial sector. 
 
 
1.4.2 Mincer Wage Model with Different Types of School 
The current Italian education system is composed by primary, secondary, 
upper secondary and tertiary education. Primary school is compulsory for children 
aged between 6 and 11 years. Lower secondary education is also compulsory, free 
of charge and lasts three years. Post compulsory education is divided into the 
following categories: classical, scientific and pre-school teacher training, artistic 
education, technical school and vocational education. Upper secondary education 
lasts from three to five years, depending on the type of school. Since 1969, the 
selection of the type school does not preclude access to tertiary education. 
Graduation from upper secondary schools requires a leaving school certificate 
examination and access to tertiary education is only conditional on passing this 
exam. 
In comparison with other OECD countries in 2012, average education 
attainments of the upper secondary education in Italy is substantially low as 
shown in Table 1.4. On average across OECD countries, the percentage of 25-34 
year-olds with at least upper secondary education is 18 percent higher than that 
among 55-64 year-olds (about 82 percent against 64 percent). This difference for 
cohort can be explained by the observed general decline in demand for manual 
labor and for basic cognitive skills (easily replicated by computers), in favor of a 
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sharp increase in the demand for complex communication and advanced 
analytical skills, which require a more educated labor force. 
 
Table 1.4 - Percentage of adults who have attained at least upper secondary education, by age 
group (2012)  
  25-34 years old 55-64 years old 
OECD average 82 64 
Italy 72 42 
Source: OECD (2014) 
 
In Italy, just 72 percent of the age-group 25-34 (versus an OECD average of 
82 percent) has attained at least upper secondary education; however, such a 
percentage is much higher than the 42 percent of the 55-64 age-group.  
For what concerns tertiary education in OECD countries we observe the 
same upward trend of education attainment for younger cohorts of population as 
reported in Table 1.5 (from 24 percent to 39 percent): younger adults have higher 
tertiary education than older adults by an average of 15 percentage points. 
 
Table 1.5 - Percentage of adults who have attained tertiary education, by age group (2012)  
  25-34 years old 55-64 years old 
OECD average 39 24 
Italy 22 11 
Source: OECD (2014) 
 
In Italy in 2012 the percentage of population in the 25-34 years-olds cohort 
with a university degree is equal to 22 percent, much lower than the OECD 
average of 39 percent. Although Italy shows a very significant increase over time 
of the percentage of the population attaining tertiary education (22 percent of the 
25-34 age group must be compared with 11 percent of the 55-64 age group), we 
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notice that such difference is well below that observed for OECD countries (from 
24 percent to 39 percent).  
Considering gender in OECD and Italy, evident disparities in educational 
attainments between women and men are present in the older generations, but 
with a significant inversion in the more recent cohorts (see Tables 1.6 and 1.7). In 
particular, in OECD countries while for older generation (e.g. 55-64 age group) 
the percentage of people attaining upper secondary and tertiary education is 
significantly larger for men, for the 25-34 age group the educational level is higher 
for women.  
 
Table 1.6 – Percentage of adults who have attained at least upper secondary education, by age 
group and gender (2012) 
Women, by age group 
  25-64  25-34  35-44  45-54  55-64  
OECD average 75 84 79 72 61 
Italy 59 76 65 55 40 
 
Men, by age group 
  25-64  25-34  35-44  45-54  55-64  
OECD average 76 81 78 74 68 
Italy 56 68 59 51 45 
Source: OECD (2014) 
 
The gender gap in education in favor of women is recorded also in Italy: 8 
percent higher for the same group for upper secondary education, and 10 percent 
higher for women aged 25-34 for tertiary education. 
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Table 1.7 - Percentage of adults who have attained tertiary education, by age group and gender 
(2012) 
Women, by age group 
  25-64  25-34  35-44  45-54  55-64  
OECD average 34 44 38 30 23 
Italy 17 27 19 13 11 
      
 
Men, by age group 
  25-64  25-34  35-44  45-54  55-64  
OECD average 30 34 33 28 25 
Italy 14 17 15 11 11 
Source: OECD (2014) 
 
In all OECD countries, adults with tertiary education earn more than adults 
with upper secondary or post-secondary non-tertiary education, who, in turn, earn 
more than adults without upper secondary education. Across OECD countries, 
compared with adults with upper secondary education who have income from 
employment, those without this qualification earn about 20 percent less, those 
with post-secondary non-tertiary education about 10 percent more, those with 
tertiary-vocationally oriented education about 30 percent more, and those with 
tertiary-academically oriented education or advanced research earn about 70 
percent more. 
Higher educational attainment is associated with higher wages during a 
person’s working life. On average across OECD countries, wages increase with 
the level of educational attainment, but this increase is particularly large for older 
workers. People with higher levels of education are more likely to be employed, 
and remain employed, and have more opportunities to gain experience on the job. 
On average, the wages of tertiary-educated 55-64 year-olds is larger than that for 
25-64 year-olds: by 36 percent for OECD countries, by 43 percent for Italy. 
Regardless of the level of education, the gender gap in wages persists. Across 
OECD countries, a tertiary-educated woman earns about 73 percent of what a 
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tertiary educated man earns (in Italy women who have obtained a tertiary degree 
earn 69 percent or less of tertiary-educated men). 
Finally, in all OECD countries, individuals with a tertiary-level degree have 
a greater chance of being employed than those without such a degree. In general, 
higher education improves job prospects and the likelihood of remaining 
employed in times. In 2012, in Italy 79 percent of the population with a tertiary 
education is employed against 71 percent with an upper secondary education (84 
percent against 74 percent in OECD countries).  
 
 
1.4.2.1 The Return of Different Level of Schooling 
The empirical specification in Equation (1.11) is based on the assumption 
that the return to education is constant and independent of the level of attained 
education. In this section, we allow the marginal return to schooling to vary with 
the level of completed education by replacing years of schooling with three 
educational dummies, one for each level of completed schooling above 
compulsory school, that is vocational school, secondary and tertiary education. 
This is the multiple factor model, an alternative way to estimate returns to 
schooling, where different educational levels have separate effects on wages. 
As suggested by the “credentialism” hypothesis, in the presence of 
heterogeneity what really matters is the type of school rather than the overall 
number of years spent in formal education. We investigate these issues by 
considering the highest degree attained by individual using educational dummies 
rather than years of schooling in our wages regressions. In particular, we look at 
education achievements by broad levels: compulsory school (no schooling, 
primary school and junior high school), vocational, upper secondary and tertiary 
education. 
Also in the case of the estimate the returns of education from different type 
of school, we deal with the problem of endogeneity by using instrumental 
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variables. We apply the two step methodology proposed by Vella and Gregory 
(1996). The empirical strategy consists of estimating the two following equations: 
ln 𝑤(𝑠𝑖 , 𝑥𝑖) = 𝛼0𝑖 + ∑ 𝜑ℎ𝐸𝑖ℎ
ℎ=1,3
+𝛽0𝑥𝑖 + 𝛽1𝑥𝑖
2 + 𝜀𝑖 (1.12) 
𝑠𝑖
∗ = 𝑧𝑖𝛾 + 𝑣𝑖 (1.13) 
where 𝑤𝑖 is the real hourly wage, 𝐸𝑖ℎ are educational dummies that correspond to 
the highest degree achieved by the individual, 𝑥𝑖 and 𝑧𝑖 are observed attributes, 𝜀𝑖 
and 𝑣𝑖 are normally distributed error terms with zero means and finite variances, 
𝑠𝑖
∗ is the latent level of education. We define 𝑠𝑖 as the observed level of education, 
that takes the following discrete values: 
𝑠𝑖 = {
1             if 𝑠𝑖
∗ < 𝜇0 
2   if 𝜇0 ≤ 𝑠𝑖
∗ ≤ 𝜇1 
3             if 𝑠𝑖
∗ ≥ 𝜇1 
 
 
(1.14) 
and associate 𝑠 to the educational dummies by setting 𝐸𝑖ℎ = 1 if 𝑠𝑖 = ℎ  and 𝐸𝑖ℎ =
0 otherwise. 
We use a two steps procedure to estimate the coefficients. In the first step we 
estimate an ordered Probit model for educational attainment as a function of the 
instrument used in the previous IV estimation. In the second step, we include the 
score9 associated to the ordered Probit in the wages equation and we then apply 
ordinary least squares. Our specification of the ordered Probit includes the same 
covariates of the instrumental equation used before. 
The interpretation of the estimated coefficients is in terms of additional 
return that the educational level provides to the individual with respect to the 
reference group that is compulsory school. Our results are reported in Table 1.8. 
For instance, in 2012, an employee with a high school degree earns, on average, 
25.6 percent more than an employee with the same covariate belonging to the 
                                                          
9 See Idson and Feaster (1990) for details on the computation of the score. 
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reference group. This differential increase to 56.5 percent for graduated 
individuals. 
The estimated coefficients of the score have always a negative sign, implying 
that the covariance between unobservable variables that affect wages and 
educational choice is negative. This means that an individual attains a lower 
educational level than predicted, because individuals with higher ability have a 
higher marginal cost of schooling in terms of foregone wages, due to more 
attractive wage offer. Hence, these individuals tend to acquire less education that 
predicted education and earn higher wages.  
 
Table 1.8 – Second stage OLS estimates. Dependent Variable: log of hourly wages less tax. 
Omitted categories are: Center (DUMMY_CENTER); Industrial sector 
(DUMMY_INDUSTRIAL). 
VARIABLES 1995 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 
          
VOCATIONAL 0.210*** 0.0632 0.214*** 0.218*** 0.138*** 0.159*** 0.0669* 0.150*** 0.0581 
 (0.0349) (0.0558) (0.0332) (0.0368) (0.0404) (0.0313) (0.0391) (0.0570) (0.0417) 
UPPER_SECONDARY 0.372*** 0.253*** 0.380*** 0.354*** 0.223*** 0.351*** 0.278*** 0.368*** 0.256*** 
 (0.0304) (0.0504) (0.0362) (0.0440) (0.0556) (0.0404) (0.0398) (0.0578) (0.0532) 
TERTIARY 0.752*** 0.514*** 0.769*** 0.739*** 0.637*** 0.740*** 0.605*** 0.746*** 0.565*** 
 (0.0508) (0.0838) (0.0567) (0.0828) (0.0880) (0.0682) (0.0695) (0.105) (0.0924) 
EXPERIENCE 0.0213*** 0.0191*** 0.0239*** 0.0281*** 0.0155*** 0.0264*** 0.0242*** 0.0160*** 0.0183*** 
 (0.00328) (0.00669) (0.00348) (0.00509) (0.00433) (0.00355) (0.00436) (0.00437) (0.00442) 
EXPERIENCE^2 -0.000239*** -0.000185 -0.000303*** -0.000394*** -0.000198* -0.000386*** -0.000311*** -6.27e-05 -0.000107 
 (7.85e-05) (0.000155) (7.95e-05) (0.000122) (0.000111) (8.39e-05) (0.000111) (0.000101) (0.000103) 
DUMMY_MALE 0.135*** 0.124*** 0.102*** 0.0987*** 0.0684*** 0.109*** 0.155*** 0.160*** 0.105*** 
 (0.0256) (0.0344) (0.0181) (0.0245) (0.0265) (0.0200) (0.0215) (0.0268) (0.0226) 
DUMMY_MARRIED 0.00754 0.0535 0.0531** 0.00621 0.0434 -0.00680 -0.0444 0.0209 0.00593 
 (0.0254) (0.0447) (0.0244) (0.0371) (0.0310) (0.0222) (0.0276) (0.0276) (0.0325) 
NCOMP 0.0165** 0.0112 0.00124 0.00223 -0.00471 0.0322*** 0.0250*** -0.000861 0.0202* 
 (0.00734) (0.0144) (0.00742) (0.0101) (0.00910) (0.00840) (0.00860) (0.0108) (0.0113) 
DUMMY_HOUSEHOLD -0.00255 -0.00839 0.00905 0.0269 0.0268 0.0376** 0.0125   
 (0.0257) (0.0352) (0.0179) (0.0240) (0.0239) (0.0187) (0.0237)   
DUMMY_TOWN 0.00673 0.0374 0.00600 -0.0792** -0.00873 0.0444* 0.0189 -0.0296 -0.0102 
 (0.0211) (0.0411) (0.0209) (0.0349) (0.0422) (0.0239) (0.0304) (0.0373) (0.0394) 
DUMMY_NORTH 0.0366** 0.0775*** 0.0463*** 0.0494** 0.0599** -0.00521 0.00325 0.0606** 0.0492* 
 (0.0168) (0.0282) (0.0162) (0.0232) (0.0282) (0.0182) (0.0227) (0.0283) (0.0275) 
DUMMY_SOUTH -0.0345* 0.0428 -0.0284 -0.0114 -0.00934 -0.0761*** -0.0489** 0.0167 -0.0119 
 (0.0187) (0.0314) (0.0214) (0.0273) (0.0330) (0.0219) (0.0249) (0.0289) (0.0332) 
DUMMY_AGRICULTURAL -0.118 -0.143 -0.190*** -0.0991* -0.129*** -0.151** -0.0997** -0.00494 -0.115** 
 (0.0717) (0.0921) (0.0578) (0.0577) (0.0406) (0.0746) (0.0502) (0.0694) (0.0564) 
DUMMY_PUBLIC 0.114*** 0.0991*** 0.0230 0.0216 0.0935*** 0.0464* 0.105*** 0.0545 0.0664 
 (0.0227) (0.0330) (0.0230) (0.0313) (0.0346) (0.0282) (0.0273) (0.0390) (0.0422) 
DUMMY_OTHER_SECTOR 0.0103 0.0165 -0.000773 -0.00667 0.00656 -0.0134 0.00719 0.00186 -0.0487* 
 (0.0179) (0.0388) (0.0197) (0.0232) (0.0260) (0.0194) (0.0235) (0.0263) (0.0254) 
DUMMY_SECT_PARENTS 0.00569 0.0543** -0.0108 -0.000419 0.00189 -0.0120 0.0293 0.00830 -0.0150 
 (0.0180) (0.0255) (0.0146) (0.0185) (0.0188) (0.0160) (0.0189) (0.0215) (0.0240) 
DUMMY_PART_TIME 0.0355 0.0622 0.0729** -0.0739* -0.0360 0.00195 0.0121 0.0393 -0.0212 
 (0.0346) (0.0637) (0.0315) (0.0433) (0.0391) (0.0398) (0.0353) (0.0368) (0.0332) 
SCORE -0.0543*** 0.00650 -0.0958*** -0.0770*** -0.0362 -0.0857*** -0.0437* -0.0960*** -0.0556* 
 (0.0187) (0.0317) (0.0214) (0.0275) (0.0319) (0.0238) (0.0255) (0.0369) (0.0317) 
          
Constant 1.576*** 1.596*** 1.596*** 1.613*** 1.803*** 1.608*** 1.634*** 1.601*** 1.636*** 
 (0.0462) (0.0984) (0.0456) (0.0612) (0.0568) (0.0596) (0.0545) (0.0705) (0.0655) 
          
Observations 4,352 1,468 3,783 3,321 3,405 3,437 2,836 2,145 2,112 
R-squared 0.412 0.317 0.339 0.286 0.245 0.327 0.345 0.295 0.327 
Robust standard errors in parenthesis 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
30 
 
Considering different educational attainment, vocational school seems to 
have a not clear pattern, from 21 percent in 1995 to 15 percent in 2010. The rate 
of return of secondary school is not constant over the period considered, but it 
shows a slightly decreasing trend from 1995 to 2010. The same trend is observed 
for the rate of return of tertiary education (university). 
 
Figure 1.3 – Rate of Return of Different Types of School 1995-2012  
 
 
However, even if the college premium does not have a particular trend, 
attending college let to have between 30 percent and 40 percent of higher wages. 
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Figure 1.4 – Annual Rate of Return of Different Types of School 1995-2012  
(reference category: compulsory school) 
 
 
 
Moreover, we assume that these returns can be spread evenly among the 
years of school required to complete a degree (see Figure 1.4). It turns out that the 
increase in wages due to an additional year of vocational school, upper secondary 
school and college is respectively 5 percent, 7.4 percent and 7.6 percent in 2010. 
Hence, there is evidence that returns to education are not constant but increase 
with the level of attained education.  
Finally, considering experience and the other control variables that are 
included in the estimation, we do not observe significant changes from the IV 
estimates. 
 
 
5 Concluding Remarks 
We have studied the wage function in Italy, focusing on the role of return to 
education. Using cross-sectional data from the 1995 to 2012 waves of the Bank 
of Italy survey on the income and wealth of Italian household, we have applied 
instrumental variables estimation to solve the problem of endogeneity. The 
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evidence is that returns to schooling have changed over the period considered, 
1995-2012, and are between 5.4 percent and 7.9 percent, recording the highest 
level for 2006 and the lowest in 2012. Considering different sector of 
employment, a relative convenience to work in the public sector emerges. In 
addition, there is an evidence of a gender pay gap, in favor of men for all the 
period considered. 
When the type of school attended is taken into consideration, we also find 
that the returns to education increase with higher levels of educational attainment. 
In this case, to solve the problem of endogeneity, an ordered Probit is applied to 
the choice of educational attainment and then we add the score of the Probit 
estimation, to the original equation and apply OLS. In particular, for 2010, the 
estimated coefficient of the educational dummy is respectively 15 percent for 
vocational school, 36.8 percent for upper secondary, and 74.6 percent for college 
education. More able subjects, who received better wage offers, have lower 
education than predicted, because of the relative incentive to anticipate labor 
market entry (as signaled by the negative coefficient of the score). 
In this analysis we take into consideration only employees excluding self-
employed because of low reliability of their declared earnings. Restricting the 
analysis only to employees probably leads to an underestimation of the returns to 
education in Italy. However, the possible presence of outliers in earnings of 
certain categories of self-employed (typically professionals and managers) could 
lead to an upward bias and the solution to this problem and is left to future 
research. 
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Chapter 2 
 
A Semiparametric Estimate of the 
Mincer Wage Function in Italy 
 
 
Abstract. Past studies on return of education assume that the 
marginal rate of return is constant over all levels of education. The 
main objective of this chapter is to relax this assumption and the 
parametric structure of the related econometric model. In this 
matter, it is possible to test the non-linearity of the returns of 
schooling. Moreover, the findings allow exploring the nature of 
the shape of the returns function. In order to pursuit the aim of this 
work, a semiparametric additive model is applied using data from 
the Bank of Italy’s Survey of Household Income and Wealth 
(SHIW). To deal with the endogeneity of omitted variables in the 
wage equation a control function method is performed. Results 
show that the wages−schooling relationship is non-linear, 
allowing for return to education that depend on the level of 
schooling. 
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2.1 Introduction 
The most of contributes estimating the Mincer wage function inspired by the 
pioneering work by Mincer (1974) assume a constant rate of return on schooling 
and a quadratic specification for the impact of experience on wage. In this chapter, 
we estimate the wage function without imposing any restriction on the shape of 
marginal impact of education and experience on wage.  
The policy implications of our analysis range from the possibility to target 
more precisely the effort of Government on education, to provide a differentiated 
support to on-the-job training conditioned to the year of experience. 
The rate of return on education has been estimated in literally hundreds of 
studies (for a review see, e.g., Psacharopoulos 1994, Ashenfelter et al. 1999, 
Harmon et al. 2000). The vast majority of these works assumes that the marginal 
rate of return is constant over all levels of education, even though some studies 
have found significant nonlinearities. In particular, Mincer (1974),  
Psacharopoulos (1985, 1994) and Hamon and Walker (1999) document 
significant diminishing return on education, while Card and Kruger (1992) 
provide evidence in favour of increasing returns at low level of education. Finally, 
Heckman and Polacheck (1974) and Card (1995, 1999) argue that the return on 
education appears approximately constant. Heckman et al. (2008) provide 
evidence against the assumptions that schooling has a constant marginal impact 
on wage, and that the impact on wage of schooling and experience can be 
separately estimated10. The literature is therefore not conclusive on this point. 
The literature has instead paid less attention to the shape of the impact of 
experience on wage. The use a quadratic specification makes the estimate subject 
to an important misspecification bias. Murphy and Welch (1990) using a quadratic 
specification represent an attempt to limit this bias; in the same respect  Zheng 
                                                          
10 They formally reject the hypothesis of linearity in returns to education in the Mincer regression 
using US national level census data for all census years from 1940 to 1990. 
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(2000) proposes the use of  higher ordered polynomials. Also for this feature of 
the model a conclusion is not still reached. 
Semiparametric techniques appear particularly well suited to deal with the 
problem of specification of Mincer wage function. So far their use has been 
limited by endogeneity, generally due to the presence of omitted variables 
(typically the unobserved individual ability). But the use of control function 
approach appears to effectively circumvent this drawback11. In particular, we 
estimate a semiparametric Mincer wage function, in which both return on 
education and experience enter as nonparametric terms. Our methodology for the 
estimate of semiparametric model is based on Wood (2011), integrated with the 
control function method as discussed by Blundell and Powell (2003). 
To our knowledge, no analysis on a semiparametric specification of Mincer 
wage function is available for Italy. More importantly, we provide evidence that 
the return on education for all the available waves in the period 1995-2012 are 
increasing in the level of education, starting from 4 percent for five years of 
schooling to 8 percent for fifteen year of schooling on average. However, 
decreasing returns are observed for workers with 18 years of schooling (tertiary 
education), from 2008 to 2012. The impact of experience, on the contrary, appears 
well approximated by the quadratic form generally used in the literature, even 
though in some waves the estimated relationship is approximately linear. 
Endogeneity of education appears pervasive in all the estimates, justifying the use 
of the control function approach. 
The chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a more general 
version of Mincer wage function, which includes the possibility of varying return 
on education and experience. Section 3 describes the sample used in the analysis, 
while Section 4 contains the estimates. Finally, Section 5 concludes. Technical 
stuff are gathered in appendix B. 
                                                          
11 Garen (1984) represents an early application of the control function approach to estimate 
Mincer wages function, but he does not consider a semiparametric specification. 
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2.2 Semiparametric Specification of the Mincer Wage 
Function 
In Section 2 of Chapter 1, we derived the Mincer wage function as: 
ln 𝑤(𝑠𝑖 , 𝑥𝑖) = 𝛼0𝑖 + 𝜌𝑠𝑠𝑖 + 𝛽0𝑥𝑖 + 𝛽1𝑥𝑖
2 + 𝜀𝑖, (2.1) 
where 𝜀𝑖 is a mean zero residual with 𝐸(𝜀𝑖|𝑠𝑖 , 𝑥𝑖) = 0, and 𝛼0 = ln 𝐸0 − 𝜅(1 +
𝜌𝑝𝑠),    𝛽0 = 𝜅 [𝜌𝑝𝑠 (1 +
1
2𝑇
) +
1
𝑇
] − 𝛿,   𝛽1 = −
𝜌𝑝𝑠𝜅
2𝑇
. 
Equation (2.1) is based on two key assumptions: the return on education is 
independent of the level of education and the investment in human capital of 
employed workers is hyperbolic declining with experience as suggested by Ben-
Porath (1967) model. Relaxing these two assumptions leads to the more general 
Mincer wage function as follows:  
ln 𝑤(𝑠𝑖 , 𝑥𝑖) = 𝛼0𝑖 + 𝑓1(𝑠𝑖) + 𝑓2(𝑥𝑖) + 𝜀𝑖 , (2.2) 
Equation (2.2) represent a semiparametric specification of Mincer wage 
function, which allows both to alleviate the potential misspecification bias of 
original formulation and at the same time limits the computational burden of a full 
nonparametric specification. 
The first derivative of 𝑓1 and 𝑓2respectively represent the marginal return on 
education and experience. 
 
 
2.2.1 Endogeneity of Schooling  
In the literature, there is a wide consensus that the presence of omitted 
variables in the estimate of Mincer wage function poses a key problem of 
endogeneity. In particular, the unobserved individual ability could significantly 
affect the choice of education; in this regard parents' schooling is generally used 
as instrumental variable as we discuss in Chapter 1. 
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Blundell and Powell (2003) discuss three approaches to deal with 
endogeneity in semiparametric models: standard instrumental variable approach, 
fitted value approach and control function approach, arguing that the last provides 
the best choice. In particular, the control function approach treats the endogeneity 
problem as a problem of omitted variables, where omitted variable is estimated in 
the first stage by regressing the endogenous variable on the instrumental variable 
along with other independent variables. The estimated residual is then included as 
an independent variable in the second stage to control for endogeneity. 
The implementation of the control function approach in the semiparametric 
model proceeds with the calculation of residuals from the first-stage 
semiparametric regression: 
𝑠𝑖 = 𝜋1(𝑧𝑖) + 𝜋2(𝑥𝑖) + 𝑣𝑖, (2.3) 
where 𝑧𝑖 is an instrumental variable, 𝑥𝑖 is the experience variable, 𝑣𝑖 is the 
unobserved error term, 𝜋1(. )and 𝜋2(. ) are the unspecified functions on the 
instrumental variable and on experience. Then, the estimated residuals from 
Equation (2.3) are inserted in the second stage semiparametric regression as an 
independent variable, i.e.: 
ln 𝑤(𝑠𝑖 , 𝑥𝑖) = 𝛼0𝑖 + 𝑓1(𝑠𝑖) + 𝑓2(𝑥𝑖) + 𝛾1𝑣?̂? + 𝜀𝑖, (2.4) 
where 𝛾1is an unspecified parameter on estimated residuals, 𝑣?̂?, from the first 
stage. 
Test on the presence of endogeneity are made on the estimate of parameter 
𝛾1; in particular, the rejection of null hypothesis of 𝛾1=0 results in the not 
possibility to reject the presence of endogeneity in the estimate.  
Finally, Blundell and Powell (2003) discusses how the following 
restriction: 
𝐸(𝜀|𝑆, 𝑋, 𝑍) = 𝐸(𝜀|𝑆, 𝑋, 𝑣) = 𝐸(𝜀|𝑣) (2.5) 
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must hold for a correct application of the control function approach. We will 
discuss all these diagnostics of estimation in the section of results. 
 
 
2.3 Data and Sources 
The analysis is based on the same sample used in Chapter 1. In particular, 
data come from the Bank of Italy’s Survey of Household Income and Wealth 
(SHIW), which reports several socio-economic characteristics of Italian 
households. The SHIW is a biannual survey on Italian families with a sample of 
approximately 8,000 household per year. From 1995 to 2012 observations from 
nine subsequent surveys are available. SHIW contains information both on 
households (family composition) and on individuals; moreover, it provides 
detailed information on several characteristics of workers within each household, 
such as their net yearly wages, average weekly hours of work and number of 
months of employment per year, educational attainment (the highest completed 
school degree), job experience, gender, marital status, sector of employment, 
household composition, parents background, regions of residence, and town size. 
We consider a sub-sample of men and women between 15-64 years old, full 
time and part time employees, working either in the public or in the private sector 
and such that information about wages are available. In the analysis, we exclude 
self-employed because of the low reliability of their declared earnings. As 
discussed by Brandolini and Cannari (1994), SHIW seems to underestimate the 
self-employed earnings of about 50 percentage points. 
 
 
2.3.1 Variables Used in the Analysis 
Mincer wage function in Eq. (2.2) refers to the (log of) hourly price of labor 
as correct measure of worker’s wages (LOGY_H), and, this is indeed the measure 
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used by most empirical studies12 (Brunello and Miniaci, 1999; Blundell, Dearden 
and Sianesi, 2005; Ciccone, Cingano and Cipollone, 2006). SHIW contains yearly 
net wages of taxes and social security contributions. Additional information on 
the average number of hours worked per week and on the number of months 
worked per year, can be used to estimate the hourly net wage, which is calculated 
by yearly net wages divided by months worked multiplied by hours worked each 
month. 
Schooling attainment (SCHOOL) is generally measured by the number of 
years spent at school. SHIW does not contain information about this number of 
years, but only on the highest degree attained by individuals. Following a common 
approach in literature (Vieira, 1999; Brunello and Miniaci, 1999) we calculate the 
educational attainment of the individual by imputing the number of years required 
to complete her/his reported maximum level of educational attainment13. More 
precisely, we consider that the (statutory) numbers of years required to obtain a 
primary and a junior school certificate is 5 and 8 years respectively; instead, for 
the upper secondary school the number of years ranges from 11 (vocational or 
technical school) to 13 (classical or scientific studies); finally, for tertiary 
education, we consider 16, 18 and 21 years for the university diploma, the college 
degree, and the postgraduate degree (e.g. Ph.D.) respectively. It is important to 
remark that in Italy the statutory number of years can be significantly different 
from the actual number of years spent to obtain a degree, especially at college 
because of the high percentage of irregular student. 
Many empirical studies use age as a proxy for the (working) experience of 
individuals. But this choice can be severely biased, especially for young cohorts. 
Other authors use potential experience, defined as the difference between the 
current age and the age at the labor market entry, but they ignore the possibility 
                                                          
12  Hourly wages can be affected by measurement errors because we calculate them as total wages 
divided by hours of work. 
13  Standard, not actual, years of formal schooling are recorded. Since students who fail to reach 
a standard have to repeat the year, the actual number of years is likely to be underestimated. 
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of unemployment or underemployment, again a crucial feature for young cohorts. 
In this work we use, as proxy for experience (EXPERIENCE), the number of 
years for which a worker has been paid social security contribution; they should 
reflect the effective years of training on the job and learning-by-doing activities. 
We introduce several control variables in the analysis to account for 
individual characteristics and for differences in the labor market. A gender 
dummy (DUMMY_MALE) controls for different wage levels between men and 
women. Marital status also enter into the analysis as a dummy variable 
(DUMMY_MARRIED) taking the value 1 if the person is formally married, 0 
otherwise. Part-time work is captured through a separate dummy variable 
(DUMMY_PART_TIME), since the assumption that each working hour makes 
the same contribution to weekly wages (constancy of the hourly wage) may not 
hold across workers with different time status (part time versus full time).  
In addition, controls are introduced for family composition, as a proxy for the 
influence of housework, particularly important in the female labor supply 
(Heckman and Killingsworth, 1986). We control for the number of components 
of the family (NCOMP) and for the fact that the individual is the head of his/her 
household (DUMMY_HOUSEHOLD). 
Controls for sector (DUMMY_AGRICULTURAL for the agricultural 
sector, DUMMY_INDUSTRIAL for the industrial sector, DUMMY_PUBLIC for 
the public sector and DUMMY_OTHER_SECTOR for other sector different from 
the previous ones) should capture potential factors from the demand side of labor 
market (e.g. imperfectly competitive labor markets). In the same light, we add 
some controls for the geographical area of residence: one dummy for the town of 
residence that has more than 500.000 inhabitants (DUMMY_TOWN), and three 
different dummies for the Italian macro-regions: North, Center and South 
(DUMMY_NORTH, DUMMY_CENTER and DUMMY_SOUTH).  
Our instruments for schooling will be a set of variables that measure family 
background, including the highest completed educational level by the father and 
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the mother of the interviewed individual (SCHOOL_F and SCHOOL_M). There 
is a long tradition in using family background variables, typically the level’s of 
parent’s schooling, as a valid instruments (Cannari and D’Alessio, 1995; Card, 
1999; Trostel et al., 2002). The idea is based on the observation of persistence 
across generation about the level of schooling and it is theoretically justified by 
involuntary transmission of human capital. 
Table 2.1 reports some descriptive statistics of the main variables used in the 
empirical analysis for all the waves (wages are expressed in euro 2012). 
 
Table 2.1 - Means and standard deviations of the variables used in the empirical analysis for the 
entire sample (1995, 1998, 2000, 2002, 2004, 2006, 2008, 2010, 2012) 
Variable Mean S. d. Description 
LOGY_H 2,265 0,438 Logarithm of the hourly wages less tax 
SCHOOL 11,373 3,800 
Schooling attainment, that is the number of 
years spent at school 
EXPERIENCE 17,683 10,673 
Number of years for which it has been paid 
social security contributions, as a proxy for 
years of training on the job 
DUMMY_MALE 0,578 0,494 Gender dummy 
DUMMY_MARRIED 0,647 0,478 Dummy variable for marital status 
NCOMP 3,329 1,185 Number of components of the family 
DUMMY_HOUSEHOLD 0,475 0,499 
Household dummy, that is equal to 1 if the 
individual is the household of the family 
DUMMY_PART_TIME 0,094 0,292 Dummy variable for part time work 
DUMMY_AGRICULTURAL 0,034 0,180 Dummy variable for agricultural sector 
DUMMY_INDUSTRIAL 0,312 0,463 Dummy variable for industrial sector 
DUMMY_PUBLIC 0,320 0,466 
Dummy variable for public administration 
sector 
DUMMY_OTHER_SECTOR 0,335 0,472 Dummy variable for other sector 
DUMMY_TOWN 0,083 0,275 
Dummy variable for the town of residence that 
has more than 500.000 inhabitants 
DUMMY_NORTH 0,501 0,500 Dummy variable for North regions 
DUMMY_CENTER 0,214 0,410 Dummy variable for Center regions 
DUMMY_SOUTH 0,286 0,452 Dummy variable for South regions 
SCHOOL_F 6,094 4,094 Schooling attainment of the father's worker 
SCHOOL_M 5,346 3,711 Schooling attainment of the mother's worker 
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2.4 Results 
Table 2.2 presents the estimates for the first stage regression (Equation 2.3). 
The first stage model suggests that the individual’s education level is correlated 
with father’s and mother’s education level. The high statistical significance of the 
instrumental variables suggest that the residuals of Equation (2.3) are independent 
of these two variables. This ensures that the restriction for applying the control 
function approach in Equation (2.5) is satisfied.  
The coefficients of the correction terms provide a direct test for the presence 
of “selection bias” (endogeneity) and of “return bias” induced by sorting gains 
(self-selection). The coefficient of the control function significant, indicating that 
schooling is endogenous, and negative. One possible explanation is that the 
correction term picks up the correlation between ‘ability’ and education. In this 
case, we would interpret the result as a signal of ‘negative selection’ into 
education: individuals with higher absolute unobservable wages (say, ability) 
would be less likely to get high education levels. However, the negative 
correlation between education and unobservable earnings may simply reflect a 
downward bias (in both the linear and the semiparametric model without 
correction term) induced by large measurement errors in education, as it is likely 
to be the case, given that they are imputed. 
 
 
2.4.1 The Return on Schooling 
Figure 2.1 shows that the marginal effects of schooling from 1995 to 2012 
with 95 percent confidence limits, shown as dashed lines, which are estimated 
from the linear model (LM) and from the generalized additive model (GAM) with 
the control function. Significant non-linearity emerges from the semiparametric 
estimation of schooling that draw the shape of the entire wages-education profile 
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Based on Figure 2.1, increasing returns are evident for workers until 8 years 
of schooling (junior high school), from 1995 to 2004; however, in the following 
years they show a flat pattern. If we consider worker with almost 13 years of 
schooling (secondary school), the marginal effects across year continue to 
increase. On the other hand, decreasing returns are observed for workers with 18 
years of schooling (tertiary education), from 2008 to 2012.  
Overall, we find that the rate of return on schooling ranges from 4 percent 
for low level of schooling to 8 percent for medium-high level of schooling. This 
finding provides a strong support to any policy of incentive/support to tertiary 
education.  
 
 
2.4.2 The Experience Profile 
Figure 2.2 shows the estimated function for the experience. Also in this case, 
the semiparametric approach (GAM with CF) demonstrates a stronger power in 
comparison to the quadratic specification of the standard Mincer wage function 
(LM with CF). 
In particular, we observe different pattern for each year of the sample: from 
1995 to 2008 the experience profile is approximately a concave function, more or 
less steeper, while in 2010 and 2012 it is approximately a linear function.  
 
 
2.4.3 Control Variables 
All the control variables enter linearly in the semiparametric model. The 
estimates confirm what we have found in the first chapter as regards the sign of 
the impact. 
In particular, for the DUMMY_MALE variable, we observe a strong 
evidence of a gender pay gap, in favor of men for all the period considered. 
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Considering the geographical variables (DUMMY_NORTH and 
DUMMY_SOUTH), we observe that the DUMMY_NORTH is positive while the 
other one in negative. This means that it is more convenient to work in the north 
regions in comparison to the central regions, instead if an individual works in the 
south region he will earns less than in the center regions.  
Finally, considering different sector of employment, working in the 
agricultural sector is less convenient than working in the industrial sector. On the 
contrary, working in the public sector is more profitable than working in the 
industrial sector.
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Figure 2.1 – Estimated schooling 
 
 
Year 1995 Year 1998 Year 2000 
   
  Year 2002   Year 2004   Year 2006 
   
Year 2008 Year 2010 Year 2012 
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Figure 2.2 – Estimated experience 
 
Year 1995 Year 1998 Year 2000 
   
Year 2002 Year 2004 Year 2006 
   
Year 2008 Year 2010 Year 2012 
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Table 2.2 - First Stage GAM Estimates. Dependent Variable: log of hourly wages less tax. Omitted categories are Center 
(DUMMY_CENTER) and Industrial sector (DUMMY_INDUSTRIAL), 1995-2012. 
 
 
 
 
  1995  1998  2000  2002  2004  2006  2008  2010  2012  
Parametric coefficients: Estimate Estimate Estimate Estimate Estimate Estimate Estimate Estimate Estimate 
Constant 9,741 *** 11,245 *** 9,792 *** 9,507 *** 9,894 *** 10,480 *** 10,477 *** 11,056 *** 11,351 *** 
DUMMY_MALE 0,265 * 0,368  -0,302 ** -0,415 *** -0,419 *** -0,342 *** -0,341 ** -0,588 *** -0,399 *** 
DUMMY_MARRIED 0,521 ** -0,356  -0,017  0,290  0,644 *** 0,472 *** 0,849 *** -0,076  0,085  
NCOMP -0,154 ** -0,192 ** -0,002  0,086  -0,021  -0,013  -0,166 ** 0,215 *** 0,043  
DUMMY_HOUSEHOLD -0,162  -0,612 ** 0,174  -0,027  0,112  0,181  0,076      
DUMMY_TOWN 0,254 * -0,068  0,900 *** 0,490 *** 0,091  0,423 ** 0,384 ** 0,414 ** 0,662 ** 
DUMMY_NORTH -0,169  -0,013  0,232 * 0,377 *** 0,055  -0,258 * 0,184  -0,250  -0,445 ** 
DUMMY_SOUTH -0,199  0,024  0,040  0,255  -0,350 ** -0,655 *** -0,245  -0,307  -0,351 * 
DUMMY_AGRICULTURAL -1,222 *** -2,611 *** -1,411 *** -1,522 *** -1,381 *** -0,742 *** -1,020 *** -1,150 *** -0,899 ** 
DUMMY_PUBLIC 2,361 *** 2,241 *** 2,507 *** 2,491 *** 2,465 *** 2,431 *** 2,384 *** 2,236 *** 2,502 *** 
DUMMY_OTHER_SECTOR -0,002  0,486 ** 0,792 *** 0,489 *** 0,865 *** 0,742 *** 0,645 *** 0,637 *** 0,544 *** 
DUMMY_PART_TIME -0,662 *** -0,605 * -0,614 *** -0,526 *** -0,797 *** -0,884 *** -0,566 *** -0,811 *** -0,608 *** 
Non Parametric 
coefficients: 
E.D.F. E.D.F. E.D.F. E.D.F. E.D.F. E.D.F. E.D.F. E.D.F. E.D.F. 
SCHOOL_F 2,907 *** 2,712 *** 2,838 *** 1,012 *** 2,607 *** 2,763 *** 2,813 *** 2,625 *** 2,767 *** 
SCHOOL_M 2,371 *** 2,151 *** 1,001 *** 2,845 *** 2,331 *** 1,003 *** 1,979 *** 1,003 *** 2,575 *** 
EXPERIENCE 4,812 *** 1,003 * 1,849 *** 1,782 *** 2,845 ** 1,009 *** 1,002 *** 1,003 *** 4,118 *** 
R-sq.(adj) 0,413  0,406  0,389  0,373  0,366  0,362  0,365  0,320  0,343  
Dev. Exp. 41,5%  41,3%  39,2%  37,6%  37,0%  36,5%  36,8%  32,4%  34,9%  
REML score 11.84  3.981  10.324  8.977  9.075  9.094  7.580  5.943  5.734  
Scale est. 9,531  8,360  9,739  10,224  9,435  8,398  9,907  11,505  10,908  
Obs. 4.352   1.468   3.783   3.321   3.405   3.437   2.836   2.145   2.112   
(***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1) 
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Table 2.3 - Second Stage GAM Estimates. Dependent Variable: log of hourly wages less tax. Omitted categories are Center 
(DUMMY_CENTER) and Industrial sector (DUMMY_INDUSTRIAL), 1995-2012. 
 
 
 
  1995 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 
Parametric coefficients: Estimate Estimate Estimate Estimate Estimate Estimate Estimate Estimate Estimate 
Constant 2,120  *** 2,115  *** 2,195  *** 2,238  *** 2,218  *** 2,220  *** 2,194  *** 2,214  *** 2,184  *** 
DUMMY_MALE 0,131  *** 0,116  *** 0,095  *** 0,097  *** 0,075  *** 0,109  *** 0,150  *** 0,155  *** 0,103  *** 
DUMMY_MARRIED 0,007  0,054  0,055  *** 0,004  0,038  * -0,010  -0,049  ** 0,025  0,005  
NCOMP 0,017  *** 0,017  * 0,000  0,003  -0,004  0,031  *** 0,029  *** -0,001  0,021  *** 
DUMMY_HOUSEHOLD -0,006  -0,002  0,009  0,024  0,022  0,034  ** 0,009      
DUMMY_TOWN 0,004  0,032  0,007  -0,082  *** -0,016  0,041  ** 0,003  -0,035  -0,011  
DUMMY_NORTH 0,038  *** 0,067  ** 0,046  *** 0,046  ** 0,060  *** -0,008  0,000  0,055  *** 0,046  ** 
DUMMY_SOUTH -0,027  * 0,056  ** -0,014  0,005  0,006  -0,053  ** -0,034  * 0,018  -0,008  
DUMMY_AGRICULTURAL -0,080  *** -0,040  -0,148  *** -0,056  * -0,099  *** -0,135  *** -0,067  * 0,012  -0,118  ** 
DUMMY_PUBLIC 0,110  *** 0,047  0,028  * 0,009  0,064  *** 0,018  0,081  *** 0,058  ** 0,070  ** 
DUMMY_OTHER_SECTOR 0,015  0,006  -0,003  -0,015  -0,005  -0,026  * 0,002  0,002  -0,049  ** 
DUMMY_PART_TIME 0,034  0,080  ** 0,081  *** -0,054  ** -0,017  0,016  0,012  0,041  -0,021  
FIRST STAGE_RES -0,013  *** -0,014  ** -0,025  *** -0,027  *** -0,022  *** -0,035  *** -0,017  *** -0,028  *** -0,016  *** 
Non Parametric coefficients: E.D.F.   E.D.F.   E.D.F.   E.D.F.   E.D.F.   E.D.F.   E.D.F.   E.D.F.   E.D.F.   
SCHOOL 3,895  *** 3,630  *** 3,401  *** 2,584  *** 3,776  *** 2,652  *** 3,212  *** 3,548  *** 4,000  *** 
EXPERIENCE 2,874  *** 2,284  *** 4,539  *** 6,407  *** 2,747  *** 5,510  *** 6,319  *** 1,345  *** 2,614  *** 
R-sq.(adj) 0,420  0,317  0,345  0,299  0,250  0,338  0,352  0,295  0,323  
Dev. Exp. 42,3%  32,7%  34,9%  30,4%  25,4%  34,2%  35,8%  30,1%  32,9%  
REML score 2.005  834  1.792  2.042  2.168  1.664  1.388  1.268  1.199  
Scale est. 0,102  0,110  0,105  0,153  0,160  0,109  0,122  0,142  0,145  
Obs. 4.352   1.468   3.783   3.321   3.405   3.437   2.836   2.145   2.112   
(***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1) 
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2.4.4 The choice between Education and Experience 
In this section, we simulate a counterfactual scenario: one-year education 
expansion for all individuals of the sample, holding other variables constant 
except experience (one year less), in order to assess the impact on the wages. 
Therefore, we calculate:  
ln 𝑤𝐶𝐹(𝑠𝑖 , 𝑥𝑖) = 𝛼0𝑖 + 𝑓1(𝑠𝑖 + 1) + 𝑓2(𝑥𝑖 − 1) + 𝜀𝑖 , (2.6) 
where 𝑤𝐶𝐹  is the counterfactual wage of an individual, where we simulate 
that the individual has attained one more year of schooling, and as a consequence 
one year less of experience, because of the postponement of entrance in the labor 
market. In particular, we calculate the difference between the expected 
counterfactual and the predicted wage (Equation 2.2) by the model: 
ln 𝑤 𝐶𝐹(𝑠𝑖 , 𝑥𝑖) − ln 𝑤(𝑠𝑖 , 𝑥𝑖) =  ln
𝑤𝐶𝐹(𝑠𝑖 , 𝑥𝑖)
𝑤(𝑠𝑖 , 𝑥𝑖)
≈
𝑤𝐶𝐹 − 𝑤
𝑤
=
= (𝑓1(𝑠𝑖 + 1) − 𝑓1(𝑠𝑖)) + (𝑓2(𝑥𝑖 − 1) − 𝑓2(𝑥𝑖)) (2.7) 
Applying the semi-parametric estimates of the coefficients of the Mincer 
wage equation, we estimate the variation on the wage given in Equation (2.7). Our 
results show that the impact is positive (Figure 2.3) for all the years considered, 
but the magnitude is different. In particular, the impact is around 5 percent in 1995 
and 1998, then increases until 2006 reaching the highest level at 6.6 percent and 
then decrease to 3.7 in 2012. 
By a policy maker perspective, having one year education expansion in Italy, 
is powerful to have a positive impact in the wages, but the advantage is decreasing 
in the last period of the analysis.  
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Figure 2.3 – Estimated impact of one more year of education (and one less of experience) 
on the log of hourly wages with 95% confidence intervals 
 
 
 
 
 
2.5 Concluding Remarks 
The empirical returns to schooling is an important information for policy 
maker. In particular, understanding how the returns estimations vary with the level 
of schooling attainment could be important to a better tuning of the educational 
policies.  Policy interest focuses not only on the average returns to education but 
also on the dispersion of returns across education levels. The shape of the wages 
function is a key factor for understanding how policies of education expansion 
will affect incomes. 
Most empirical studies assume that (log of) wages are a linear function of 
the years of education and a quadratic function of the years of experience. 
We have provided evidence that such parsimonious parametric model misses 
important features of the true relationships. In our results, linearity can typically 
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be firmly rejected, thus marginal returns will differ from the average. Increasing 
returns are discovered for workers until 8 years of schooling (junior high school), 
from 1995 to 2004; however, in the following year they show a flat pattern. If we 
consider worker with almost 13 years of schooling (secondary school), the 
marginal effects across year continue to increase. On the other hand, decreasing 
returns are observed for workers with 18 years of schooling (tertiary education), 
from 2008 to 2012. 
Considering experience, from 1995 to 2008 the experience profile is 
approximately a concave function, more or less steeper, while in 2010 and 2012 
it is approximately a linear function. Therefore, semiparametric approach is 
superior to parametric ones in terms of flexibility and of predictability, even if 
partial coincident for some linear variables.  
Even if the return to education is increasing with years of schooling, the 
absolute level is below that of other countries, i.e. USA and UK (Trostel et al., 
2002; Harmon et al., 2003).  
A future line of research should remove the assumption that post-school 
investment are identical across persons and do not depend on the schooling level 
(separability). The independence between education and the return to experience, 
typically illustrated by the fact that age earnings profiles are approximately 
parallel across broad education groups, is also being questioned (Heckman, 
Lochner and Todd, Lemieux, 2003). This suggests that log wages regression may 
not be separable in education and experience and, in particular, that the return to 
experience may be affected by schooling. Various economic models14 may be able 
to explain this. These include models of endogenous post-schooling human 
capital investments as well as various lifecycle incentive models where wages are 
upward sloping. 
                                                          
14 It is possible to use Mincer’s approach to derive alternative wages equations that do not require 
that the investment ratio is independent of schooling. 
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As stated in this chapter, the semiparametric approach is more flexible to the 
parametric ones, so it would be interesting to estimate the effect of the interaction 
between education and experience applying a semiparametric estimation with a 
control function to deal with the endogeneity of schooling. 
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Chapter 3  
 
An Estimate Across Quantiles of the 
Mincer Wage Function in Italy 
 
Abstract.  
Several studies focused on the estimation of the average impact of 
schooling, experience and other variables on wages without 
investigate if they affect individuals differently over the wage 
distribution. Understanding the heterogeneity of education is 
relevant because allows to test if education can reduce or increase 
inequality. In order to take into account simultaneously 
endogeneity and heterogeneity of education, an instrumental 
variables quantile regression is applied. Our results show that, 
while returns to schooling are positive everywhere, there exists a 
large degree of heterogeneity in returns to education across the 
wage distribution. In particular, gains are higher for individuals in 
the upper tail of the wages distribution than for those in the lower 
tail. This means that education have an inequality-increasing effect 
over time, because individuals with high ability, those at the upper 
quantile of the wage distribution, seem to benefit more from 
formal education. 
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3.1 Introduction 
Many studies have investigated the average impact of several determinants, 
such as schooling, experience, gender, etc. on wages (Dickson and Harmon, 2011, 
Cingano and Cipollone, 2009). This chapter aims to understand if individuals in 
different quantile of the wage distribution are differently affected by these 
determinants. 
Applying a quantile regression, we test the hypothesis of heterogeneous 
effects of schooling, experience, gender, etc. on wages, i.e. if the effects of the 
variables are increasing, decreasing, or u-shaped across the quantiles. In addition, 
we assess the relationship between education and wage inequality and the changes 
of trends during the period under analysis. Indeed, if returns to schooling are 
heterogeneous along the wage distribution, schooling can have an impact upon 
wage inequality. 
In a simple human capital model, wage inequality can increase because 
returns to education and experience increase, or because residual or within-group 
inequality increases (Lemieux, 2008). In the case that returns are increasing from 
the lower to the higher end of the wage distribution, it can be interpreted as an 
indication that ability and education (or skills) are complement between them, and 
more able workers can benefit from additional investment in education. 
Consequently, a negative relationship between ability and returns to education 
(decreasing returns with quantile) can be interpreted as evidence of 
substitutability between education and ability. Finally, if there is no distinct 
pattern, then average returns (in the absence of biases in their estimation) capture 
the overall profitability of education (Patrinos et al., 2006, Chernozhukov, Hasen 
and Janson, 2007).  
However, two potential issues complicate the estimation of the effects of 
education on the whole wage distribution: the endogeneity of education 
attainment and heterogeneity in the returns to education. The first issue concerns 
55 
 
the causal effects of education on wages. Although there is little doubts that 
education plays an important role in determining individuals’ wages, the 
estimation of the causal effects of education on wages is not straightforward due 
to potential endogeneity and measurement error problems. Indeed, more able 
workers may get more education as well as earn more in the labor market. In this 
case, the positive observed relationship between education and wages may be 
driven by a third variable, namely ability. Moreover, information on schooling 
gathered during surveys may also be misreported. Therefore, not controlling for 
observable and unobservable determinants can preclude estimation of the causal 
inference of the underlying effects of education on wages. 
Previous empirical studies have typically relied on regression analysis and 
linear specification, focusing mainly on average effects. Although of great 
interest, the average effects can hide important information of the wage 
distribution. Moreover, average estimates do not capture information about 
inequality effects of education. For example, if the education positively affects 
more the upper tail of the wages distribution than education increases inequality 
rather than decreases it. Therefore, in order to foster equality through education, 
schooling should increase wages more for individuals in the lower tail of the 
wages distribution than for those in the upper tail. When the average effects are 
the only available information, it is not clear whether expanding educational 
opportunities will increase or decrease inequality. 
Several econometrics models deal with endogeneity and heterogeneity issues 
simultaneously (Card, 1999; Arias et al., 2001). However, empirical studies often 
deal with only one issue at a time. To overcome the endogeneity, the most applied 
approach is instrumental variable estimation (Angrist and Krueger, 1991; Harmon 
and Walker, 2000; Trostel et al., 2002; Dickson, 2013). Instead, to deal with the 
heterogeneity issue, researchers rely on different methods to account it to study 
the returns to education, i.e.: random coefficient model (Harmon et al., 2003), 
nonparametric estimation (Henderson et al., 2011), Bayesian hierarchical models 
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(Koop and Tobias, 2004) and quantile regression (Arias et al., 2001; Martins and 
Pereira, 2004; Fasih et al., 2012). Most of these studies indicate that the impact of 
education on wages is far from homogeneous. Then, the population does not seem 
to be reasonably described by a single parameter for the relation between wages 
and education. 
Harmon et al. (2003) utilize random-coefficient models to estimate the 
variance of returns to education, where returns to education were the random 
coefficient in the Mincer wage equation. They find that the dispersion of returns 
to education was quite high in the UK, and the dispersion of individual returns 
remained stable during the 1990s. 
Henderson et al. (2011) employ generalized non-parametric kernel 
estimation to estimate heterogeneous rates of return across different demographic 
groups in the USA. They find that the non-parametric median rate of schooling 
return for US workers increased significantly in the long run, from 8.2 percent in 
1950 to 14.3 percent in 2005. 
Using data from the US, Koop and Tobias (2004) estimate Bayesian 
hierarchical models to investigate the nature of heterogeneity in returns to 
schooling. They not only found strong evidence of heterogeneity in schooling 
returns, but also noted that it followed a continuous distribution, rather than a 
discrete one. 
For the purpose of our research, the more appropriate method is the quantile 
regression. This econometric model allows to estimate the returns to education 
over the wage distribution considering the heterogeneity through quantile-specific 
intercepts and quantile-specific slopes. However, to overcome endogeneity of 
schooling, recent studies by Chernozhukov and Hansen (2006; 2008; 2013) have 
proposed an instrumental variable quantile regression (IVQR) approach to 
estimate rates of return within a distributional framework that addresses both 
heterogeneity and endogeneity issues at the same time.  
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In this chapter, that approach is applied to estimate the effect of schooling, 
experience and other variables on the entire distribution of wages in Italy for the 
period 1995-2012. Finally, the evolution over time of the quantile returns to 
education and what impact the returns have on the structure of wages are 
investigated. 
The reminder of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2 introduce 
individual heterogeneity in the Mincer wage equation and present a summary of 
the empirical literature review on that topic. Section 3.3 describes the dataset used 
in the empirical estimation and the characteristics of the sample. Section 3.4 
describes the econometric methods used to estimates returns to education. Section 
3.5 presents the results, and Section 3.6 concludes. 
 
3.2 Individual Heterogeneity in the Mincer Wage Function 
In the first Chapter (in particular, in Section 1.2), the Mincerian wage 
equation has been derived as follow: 
ln 𝑤(𝑠𝑖 , 𝑥𝑖) = 𝛼0𝑖 + 𝜌𝑠𝑠𝑖 + 𝛽0𝑥𝑖 + 𝛽1𝑥𝑖
2 + 𝜀𝑖, (3.1) 
where 𝜀𝑖 is a mean zero residual with 𝐸(𝜀𝑖|𝑠𝑖 , 𝑥𝑖) = 0, and 𝛼0 = ln 𝐸0 − 𝜅(1 +
𝜌𝑝𝑠),    𝛽0 = 𝜅 [𝜌𝑝𝑠 (1 +
1
2𝑇
) +
1
𝑇
] − 𝛿,   𝛽1 = −
𝜌𝑝𝑠𝜅
2𝑇
. 
Individual heterogeneity (talents) potentially affects both the intercept of the 
wage equation (through 𝛼0𝑖) and the slope of the wage-education relation (through 
𝜌𝑠) in Equation (3.1). Therefore, three hypothesis can be tested. First, evidence of 
different returns to education for individuals with different levels of ability. More 
specifically, given that individuals acquire education up to the point where the 
marginal cost equals the marginal rate of return and that costs depend negatively 
on ability, we should observe the returns to education to be decreasing in ability. 
As pointed out by Ashenfelter and Rouse (1998), more able workers acquire more 
schooling because they face lower marginal costs and not because of higher 
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marginal benefits. This implies that higher ability individuals have on average 
higher wages, but the slope of their wage-education profile is flatter than that for 
lower ability individuals. Second, we cannot estimate the true impact of education 
on wage without solving the bias introduced by the endogeneity of schooling 
attainment, since cross-sectional estimates are (marginally) biased by an omitted 
ability variable (Heckman et al., 2006). Third, we want to study how education 
affects individuals differently taking into account both heterogeneity and 
endogeneity issues simultaneously. To incorporate these features, an instrumental 
variable quantile regression is applied, which estimates the causal effect of 
education on conditional quantiles of the wage distribution, allowing for quantile-
specific intercepts and quantile-specific slopes.  
To allow for heterogeneous effects of education on wages, we consider the 
τth conditional quantile wage function: 
𝑄ln (𝑤)[𝜏|𝑠, 𝑥] = 𝛼0(𝜏) + 𝜌𝑠(𝜏)𝑠 + 𝛽0(𝜏)𝑥 + 𝛽1(𝜏)𝑥
2, (3.2) 
where 𝜌𝑠 is the return to schooling at the τ
th quantile, and 𝜏 ∈ (0,1) →
𝛼0(𝜏) + 𝜌𝑠(𝜏)𝑠 + 𝛽0(𝜏)𝑥 + 𝛽1(𝜏)𝑥
2 is strictly increasing in τ. In Equation (3.2) 
the returns to education, experience and the intercept are function of τ, allowing 
for heterogeneous effects of these variables on wages.  
The existing literature uses conventional quantile regression to investigate 
the heterogeneous effects on wage. Koenker and Basset (1978) first introduced 
the quantile regression model. Since then, several authors have used this 
framework to explore the wage effects of schooling over the entire wage 
distribution.  
Buchinsky (1994) for US, shows that education is more profitable at the top 
of the distribution. This finding helps explain the rapidly increasing earnings 
inequality associated with rising rewards for educational qualifications at a time 
of schooling expansion.  
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Martins and Pereira (2004), utilizing quantile regression techniques, show 
that for nearly all EU countries (but Denmark, Germany and Italy could be 
considered borderline cases), returns to schooling are significantly higher at the 
top of the wage distribution. Individuals who are the top of the conditional wage 
distribution are there because of their unobserved characteristics and the results 
suggest that this group receives higher education increment. Their results imply 
that schooling aggravates within group inequality. They explain that factors such 
as over-education, ability– schooling interactions and school quality or different 
fields of study may be driving this result.  
Giustinelli (2004) applies quantile regressions to investigate the dynamic of 
educational wage premia over the period 1993–2000 for Italy. The main result is 
that the schooling premium shows a U-shaped pattern across the wage distribution 
in each sample year. Naticchioni et al. (2009), by means of quantile regressions, 
show that educational wage premia in the private sector decline across the entire 
wage distribution, for the period 1993-2004 in Italy. Patrinos et al. (2009) and 
Fasih et al. (2012) find the same evidence i.e. that returns increase across quantiles 
for Latin American countries, while returns decrease across quantile for most East 
Asian countries (the exception is Singapore, a high-income country). Hartog et al. 
(2001) examine the evolution of the returns to education in Portugal over the 
1980s and early 1990s. They apply a quantile regression analysis and they find 
that returns are higher for those at higher quantiles in the conditional wage 
distribution, and education has an important role in the expansion of wage 
inequality in Portugal.  
Carrasco et al. (2014) find that the compression of the wage distribution in 
Spain between 1995 and 2006 is largely explained by a decrease in the returns to 
education, due to an increase in the supply of high-skilled workers and the 
increasing weight of low-skilled occupations. In contrast, the widening of the 
wage distribution after 2006 is largely explained by an increase in the relative 
demand for high-skilled workers generating an increase in the school premium. 
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From all these studies, we conclude that returns to education vary 
substantially over the wage distribution, which means that average effects, while 
being of interest, lose some important distributional features of the return to 
education. These studies also suggest that returns to education tend to be 
increasing in the quantiles of wage distribution for developed countries. This is 
interpreted as a positive impact of education within-groups inequality. However, 
all this kind of studies ignore the issue of endogeneity. 
 
 
3.3 Data and Sources 
The analysis is based again on data drawn from the Bank of Italy’s Survey 
of Household Income and Wealth (SHIW), which reports several socio-economic 
characteristics of Italian households.  
The SHIW is a biannual survey on Italian families with a sample of 
approximately 8,000 household per year. From 1995 to 2012 observations from 
nine subsequent surveys are available. In particular, the SHIW contains 
information both on households (family composition) and on individuals. 
Moreover, it provides detailed information on several characteristics of workers 
within each household, such as their net yearly wages, average weekly hours of 
work and number of months of employment per year, educational attainment (the 
highest completed school degree), job experience, gender, marital status, sector 
of employment, household composition, parents background, regions of 
residence, and town size. 
We consider a sub-sample of men and women between 15-64 years old, full 
time and part time employees, working either in the public or in the private sector 
and such that information about wages are available. In the analysis, we exclude 
self-employed because of the low reliability of their declared earnings. As 
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discussed by Brandolini and Cannari (1994), SHIW seems to underestimate the 
self-employed earnings of about 50 percentage points. 
 
3.3.1 Variables Used in the Analysis 
The variables used in the empirical model are the same introduced 
previously. For the sake of clarity, discussion about them is repeated.  
As shown by Equation (3.1), wages, schooling attainment, and working 
experience of each individual are the key variables in the estimation of Mincer 
equation. 
Mincer equation refers to the (log of) hourly price of labor as correct measure 
of worker’s wages (LOGY_H), and, indeed, this is the measure used by most 
empirical studies15 (Brunello and Miniaci, 1999; Blundell, Dearden and Sianesi, 
2005; Ciccone, Cingano and Cipollone, 2006). SHIW contains yearly net wages 
of taxes and social security contributions. Additional information on the average 
number of hours worked per week and on the number of months worked per year, 
can be used to estimate the hourly net wage, which is calculated by yearly net 
wages divided by months worked multiplied by hours worked each month.  
Schooling attainment (SCHOOL) is generally measured by the number of 
years spent at school. SHIW does not contain information about this number of 
years, but only on the highest degree attained by individuals. Following a common 
approach in literature (Vieira, 1999; Brunello and Miniaci, 1999) we calculate the 
educational attainment of the individual by imputing the number of years required 
to complete her/his reported maximum level of educational attainment16. More 
precisely, we consider that the (statutory) numbers of years required to obtain a 
primary and a junior school certificate is 5 and 8 years respectively; instead, for 
                                                          
15 Hourly wages can be affected by measurement errors because we calculate them as total wages 
divided by hours of work. 
16 Standard, not actual, years of formal schooling are recorded. Since students who fail to reach a 
standard have to repeat the year, the actual number of years is likely to be underestimated. 
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the upper secondary school the number of years ranges from 11 (vocational or 
technical school) to 13 (classical or scientific studies); finally, for tertiary 
education, we consider 16, 18 and 21 years for the university diploma, the college 
degree, and the postgraduate degree (e.g. Ph.D.) respectively. It is important to 
remark that in Italy the statutory number of years can be significantly different 
from the actual number of years spent to obtain a degree, especially at college 
because of the high percentage of irregular student. 
Many empirical studies use age as a proxy for the (working) experience of 
individuals. But this choice can be severely biased, especially for young cohorts. 
Other authors use potential experience, defined as the difference between the 
current age and the age at the labor market entry, but they ignore the possibility 
of unemployment or underemployment, again a crucial feature for young cohorts. 
In this work we use, as proxy for experience (EXPERIENCE), the number of 
years for which a worker has been paid social security contribution; they should 
reflect the effective years of training on the job and learning-by-doing activities. 
We introduce several control variables in the analysis to account for 
individual characteristics and for differences in the labor market.  
A gender dummy (DUMMY_MALE) controls for different wage levels 
between men and women. Marital status also enter into the analysis as a dummy 
variable (DUMMY_MARRIED) taking the value 1 if the person is formally 
married, 0 otherwise. Part-time work is captured through a separate dummy 
variable (DUMMY_PART_TIME), since the assumption that each working hour 
makes the same contribution to weekly wages (constancy of the hourly wage) may 
not hold across workers with different time status (part time versus full time).  
In addition, controls are introduced for family composition, as a proxy for 
the influence of housework, particularly important in the female labor supply 
(Heckman and Killingsworth, 1986). We control for the number of components 
of the family (NCOMP) and for the fact that the individual is the head of his/her 
household (DUMMY_HOUSEHOLD). 
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Controls for sector (DUMMY_AGRICULTURAL for the agricultural 
sector, DUMMY_INDUSTRIAL for the industrial sector, DUMMY_PUBLIC for 
the public sector and DUMMY_OTHER_SECTOR for other sector different from 
the previous ones) should capture potential factors from the demand side of labor 
market (e.g. imperfectly competitive labor markets). In the same light, we add 
some controls for the geographical area of residence: one dummy for the town of 
residence that has more than 500.000 inhabitants (DUMMY_TOWN), and three 
different dummies for the Italian macro-regions: North, Center and South 
(DUMMY_NORTH, DUMMY_CENTER and DUMMY_SOUTH).  
Table 3.1 reports some descriptive statistics of the main variables used in the 
empirical analysis for all the waves (wages are expressed in euro 2012). 
 
Table 3.1 - Means and standard deviations of the variables used in the empirical analysis for the 
entire sample (1995, 1998, 2000, 2002, 2004, 2006, 2008, 2010, 2012) 
Variable Mean S. d. Description 
LOGY_H 2,265 0,438 Logarithm of the hourly wages less tax 
SCHOOL 11,373 3,800 
Schooling attainment, that is the number of 
years spent at school 
EXPERIENCE 17,683 10,673 
Number of years for which it has been paid 
social security contributions, as a proxy for 
years of training on the job 
DUMMY_MALE 0,578 0,494 Gender dummy 
DUMMY_MARRIED 0,647 0,478 Dummy variable for marital status 
NCOMP 3,329 1,185 Number of components of the family 
DUMMY_HOUSEHOLD 0,475 0,499 
Household dummy, that is equal to 1 if the 
individual is the household of the family 
DUMMY_PART_TIME 0,094 0,292 Dummy variable for part time work 
DUMMY_AGRICULTURAL 0,034 0,180 Dummy variable for agricultural sector 
DUMMY_INDUSTRIAL 0,312 0,463 Dummy variable for industrial sector 
DUMMY_PUBLIC 0,320 0,466 
Dummy variable for public administration 
sector 
DUMMY_OTHER_SECTOR 0,335 0,472 Dummy variable for other sector 
DUMMY_TOWN 0,083 0,275 
Dummy variable for the town of residence that 
has more than 500.000 inhabitants 
DUMMY_NORTH 0,501 0,500 Dummy variable for North regions 
DUMMY_CENTER 0,214 0,410 Dummy variable for Center regions 
DUMMY_SOUTH 0,286 0,452 Dummy variable for South regions 
DUMMY_SETT_GEN 0,374 0,484 
Dummy variable equal to 1 if the individual 
works in the same sector of the father and/or 
of the mother 
SCHOOL_F 6,094 4,094 Schooling attainment of the father's worker 
SCHOOL_M 5,346 3,711 Schooling attainment of the mother's worker 
64 
 
3.4 Methodology for the Estimates 
Many previous applied econometrics studies have typically relied on 
regression analysis and linear specification, thereby focusing mainly on average 
effects. While of interest, the average effects may hide important information in 
the rest of the wage distribution. Many variables, such as wages, have continuous 
distributions, and these distributions can change in response to treatments in ways 
not fully revealed by averages. In the following, we briefly describe the IVQR 
method that we use to estimate the causal heterogeneous returns to education 
across the wages distribution. 
In the ordinary quantile regression method, assume that the error term in the 
wage function, Equation (3.2), is independent of 𝑥 and 𝑠, Koenker and Basset 
(1978) propose to find the best predictor of log-wage given 𝑥 and 𝑠 under the 
asymmetric least absolute deviation loss. This means estimating 𝜌𝑠(𝜏) and 𝛼0(𝜏), 
𝛽0(𝜏), 𝛽1(𝜏) in Equation (3.2) by solving the following minimization problem: 
𝑄ln (𝑤)[𝜏|𝑠, 𝑋] = 𝑎𝑟𝑔 min
𝜌𝑠(𝜏),𝛽(𝜏)
𝐸[𝜑𝜏 (ln(𝑤) −𝛼0(𝜏) − 𝜌𝑠(𝜏)𝑠 −
𝛽0(𝜏)𝑥 − 𝛽1(𝜏)𝑥
2], 
(3.3) 
where 𝜑𝜏(𝜀𝑖) is the “check function” defined as 𝜑𝜏(𝜀𝑖) = [𝜏 − 1(𝜀𝑖 ≤ 0)]𝜀𝑖. 
Assuming independence between education variable and the error term may 
be too stringent because of potential unobserved wage determinants. In this 
respect, to account for potential dependence between 𝑠 and 𝑢 in a distributional 
framework, as aforementioned, we apply the instrumental variable quantile 
regression approach developed by Chernozhukov and Hansen (2006, 2008, 2013). 
As in the case of two-stage least squares, the identification of this approach 
relies on the existence of a vector of instrumental variables z that is statistically 
related to 𝑠 but independent of the error term. In addition, we have to assume that, 
given the information (𝑥, 𝑧), the distribution of the structural error does not vary 
across the endogenous state 𝑠 (“rank similarity”). The structural error is 
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responsible for heterogeneity of potential outcomes among individuals with the 
same observed characteristics, and this error term determines the relative ranking 
of observationally equivalent individuals in the distribution of potential outcomes 
given the individuals’ observed characteristics. Chernozhukov and Hansen (2006) 
show that assuming rank similarity implies the following moment condition: 
𝑃[(ln(𝑤) ≤ 𝑄ln(𝑤)(𝜏|𝑥, 𝑧)|𝑥, 𝑧)] = 𝜏; (3.4) 
𝑃[(ln(𝑤) −𝛼0(𝜏) − 𝜌𝑠(𝜏)𝑠 − 𝛽0(𝜏)𝑥 − 𝛽1(𝜏)𝑥
2 ≤ 0|𝑥, 𝑧)] = 𝜏. (3.5) 
The moment condition given in Equation (3.5) provides a statistical restriction 
that can be used to estimate the parameters 𝜌𝑠(𝜏), 𝛽0(𝜏), 𝛽1(𝜏) and 𝛼0(𝜏). 
Equation (3.5) is equivalent to the statement that zero is the 𝜏th quantile of the 
random variable ln(𝑤) − 𝑄ln(𝑤)(𝜏|𝑥, 𝑠) conditional on (𝑥, 𝑧). Chernozhukov and 
Hansen (2008) formulate the problem as finding [𝜌𝑠(𝜏) , 𝛽0(𝜏), 𝛽1(𝜏) , 𝛼0(𝜏)] 
such that zero is the solution to the standard quantile regression of 
[ln(𝑤) −𝛼0(𝜏) − 𝜌𝑠(𝜏)𝑠 − 𝛽0(𝜏)𝑥 − 𝛽1(𝜏)𝑥
2] on (𝑥, 𝑧): 
0 = 𝑎𝑟𝑔min
𝑓∈𝐹
𝐸[𝜑𝜏 (ln(𝑤) −𝛼0(𝜏) − 𝜌𝑠(𝜏)𝑠 − 𝛽0(𝜏)𝑥 −
𝛽1(𝜏)𝑥
2 − 𝑓(𝑥, 𝑧)], 
(3.6) 
where F is the class of measurable functions of (𝑥, 𝑧). In empirical application, F 
will be restricted either to the values of 𝑧𝑖 or to the predicted value from a least 
squares projection of 𝑠𝑖 on 𝑥𝑖 , 𝑧𝑖. To obtain an estimate for 𝜌𝑠(𝜏), we look for a 
value 𝜌𝑠 that makes the estimated coefficient on the instrumental variable 𝛾(𝜏, 𝜌𝑠) 
in Equation (3.6) as close to zero as in ordinary quantile regression. 
The IVQR estimator consists of a two-step procedure:  
i) for a given value of  𝜌𝑠
𝑗(𝜏), run the ordinary quantile regression of 
ln(𝑤𝑖) − 𝜌𝑠
𝑗(𝜏)𝑠𝑖 on 𝑥𝑖 and 𝑧𝑖 to obtain estimates 
?̂?0(𝜌𝑠
𝑗(𝜏), 𝜏), ?̂?0(𝜌𝑠
𝑗(𝜏), 𝜏), ?̂?1(𝜌𝑠
𝑗(𝜏), 𝜏), 𝛾(𝜌𝑠
𝑗(𝜏), 𝜏); 
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ii) then test 𝛾(𝜌𝑠
𝑗(𝜏), 𝜏) = 0 and save the corresponding Wald Statistics 
Wj. 
Then the estimation procedure has to be repeated these two steps for all the 
values in a pre-specified support for 𝜌𝑠
𝑗(𝜏) and the values that minimizes the F-
statistic is the IVQR estimator of 𝜌?̂?(𝜏)
𝐼𝑉𝑄𝑅 and the corresponding 
 ?̂?0(𝜌𝑠
𝑗(𝜏), 𝜏),  ?̂?0(𝜌𝑠
𝑗(𝜏), 𝜏) and ?̂?1(𝜌𝑠
𝑗(𝜏), 𝜏) are the IVQR estimate of 𝛼0(𝜏),
𝛽0(𝜏) and 𝛽1(𝜏). 
The IVQR approach17 allows interpretation of the 𝜌?̂?(𝜏)
𝐼𝑉𝑄𝑅 as actual effects 
on individuals having fixed their level of unobserved heterogeneity at a given 
quantile. Therefore, the effect is not only identified for the set of individual whose 
treatment is altered by switching the instrument from zero to one as in the case of 
the IV quantile treatment estimator proposed by Abadie et al. (2002). 
Furthermore, the IVQR methods put no restriction of the form of the endogenous 
variables and instruments. 
For these estimations, a set of background variables of family (Cannari and 
D’Alessio, 1995; Card, 1999; Trostel et al., 2002) will be used as instruments for 
the implementation of the IVQR methods. The idea is based on the observation of 
persistence across generation about the level of schooling and it is theoretically 
justified by involuntary transmission of human capital. In particular, our 
instruments will be a set of variables that measure family background: the highest 
completed educational level by the father and the mother of the interviewed 
individual. Therefore, more educated parents are likely to value education more 
and to fill better jobs.  
 
 
                                                          
17 We use the Stata command ivqreg, that performs an instrumental variable quantile regression 
using robust standard error formula in Chernozhukov and Hansen (2006, 2008) to evaluate 
heterogeneous marginal effect of endogenous variable. 
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3.5 Estimated Results 
3.5.1 Returns to Education across the Wage Distribution 
The results18 of estimation of Equation (3.2) by applying IVQR methods are 
shown in Table 3.2. Finding show a large degree of heterogeneity in returns to 
education. The estimated coefficients are larger in the upper tail of the wages 
distribution than  in the lower tail. This means that the highest wage earners enjoy 
larger gains from having an additional year of education.  
 
Table 3.2 – Returns to education, IVQR estimates by quantile 
Year τ=0.1 τ=0.2 τ=0.3 τ=0.4 τ=0.5 τ=0.6 τ=0.7 τ=0.8 τ=0.9 
1995 0.047*** 0.053*** 0.058*** 0.060*** 0.060*** 0.063*** 0.068*** 0.071*** 0.075*** 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) 
1998 0.065*** 0.062*** 0.061*** 0.056*** 0.054*** 0.065*** 0.060*** 0.053*** 0.068*** 
 (0.011) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.008) (0.006) (0.010) 
2000 0.063*** 0.067*** 0.063*** 0.063*** 0.066*** 0.067*** 0.072*** 0.076*** 0.084*** 
 (0.008) (0.006) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) 
2002 0.049*** 0.058*** 0.061*** 0.064*** 0.067*** 0.069*** 0.071*** 0.072*** 0.084*** 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.006) 
2004 0.065*** 0.067*** 0.062*** 0.060*** 0.061*** 0.061*** 0.063*** 0.065*** 0.074*** 
 (0.009) (0.006) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.006) 
2006 0.055*** 0.058*** 0.056*** 0.061*** 0.065*** 0.071*** 0.073*** 0.079*** 0.084*** 
 (0.010) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) 
2008 0.051*** 0.046*** 0.056*** 0.062*** 0.063*** 0.067*** 0.068*** 0.071*** 0.075*** 
 (0.010) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) 
2010 0.050*** 0.043*** 0.045*** 0.063*** 0.056*** 0.057*** 0.067*** 0.078*** 0.085*** 
 (0.010) (0.007) (0.005) (0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006) 
2012 0.049*** 0.054*** 0.053*** 0.059*** 0.063*** 0.063*** 0.065*** 0.074*** 0.077*** 
  (0.012) (0.009) (0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.007) (0.005) (0.006) (0.010) 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Robust standard errors in brackets 
 
 
Moreover, for year 1995 and year 2002 the rates of return appear to 
monotonically increase as the quantile increases. In particular, for 1995, the 
estimated return to education at the 10th percentile is equal to 4.7 percent and 
increase to 7.5 percent at the 90th percentile. For 2002, the increase is even more 
pronounced, from 4.9 percent to 8.4 percent for the same percentiles.  
                                                          
18 The results are based on the log of net hourly wages. Progressive taxation is likely to have a 
stronger impact in eroding the returns to education at the top of the distribution than at its bottom 
(Martins and Pereira, 2004). 
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Figure 3.1 – Estimated return to schooling over the wage distribution, from 1995 to 2012, by quantile, with 95% confidence intervals 
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However, for 1998 IVQR results do not show a clear pattern and for 2004 returns 
to education first decrease until 40th percentile and then increase. Overall, for all 
the other year of the sample the results still show an increasing pattern. These 
results underline that average effects are not fully informative about the 
distribution. 
To further underline the heterogeneous effects of education on wage, Figure 
3.1 provides a graphical illustration of these results reporting the quantile-specific 
returns to education from τ = 0.1 to τ=0.9 and for each year of the sample period 
(from 1995 to 2012) with the relative 95 percent pointwise confidence interval. 
Then, we examine how the impact of education on wage levels and wage 
dispersion has evolved from 1995 to 2012. To describe changes in the conditional 
wage distribution, Figure 3.2 plots all the quantile-return profiles at different years 
of the sample period. 
 
Figure 3.2 – Estimated return to schooling over the wage distribution at different years, by 
quantile 
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distribution, moving from 1995 to 2012. In particular, in the lower part of the 
wage distribution the return to schooling show a decrease from 1995 to 2010 and 
then a recovery in 2012. In the middle part of the distribution of wages, the returns 
to education are around 6 percent (except for 1998) and then in the upper part of 
the distribution we observe an increase until 2010 and then a slightly decrease in 
2012. 
 
 
3.5.2 Experience across the Wage Distribution 
We find heterogeneity also in the estimate of the return of experience 
variable. The estimated coefficients are larger in the lower tail of the wages 
distribution than in the upper tail. This means that the least wage earners enjoy 
larger gains from having an additional year of experience than do the highest wage 
earners.  
The rates of return appear to monotonically decrease as the quantile 
increases. For all the year of the sample, the results show a decreasing pattern. In 
Figure 3.3, we calculated the estimate return to experience for a worker with 20 
years-experience. In particular, for 1995, the estimated return to education at the 
10th percentile is equal to 35.3 percent and decrease to 21.5 percent at the 90th 
percentile. For 2012, the increase is even more pronounced, from 48 percent to 
22.3 percent for the same percentiles.  
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Figure 3.3 – Estimated return to experience(=20) over the wage distribution, from 1995 to 2012, by quantile 
(not reported standard errors show that differences between 0.1 and 0.9 quantiles are significant) 
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Figure 3.4 – Estimated specific intercept over the wage distribution, from 1995 to 2012, by quantile, with 95% confidence intervals 
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3.5.3 Quantile Specific Intercept across the Wage Distribution 
The econometric model we apply in the empirical analysis allows 
considering the heterogeneity also through quantile-specific intercepts. In Figure 
3.4, the estimated specific intercepts over the wage distribution are plotted for all 
the year selected in the analysis. The intercept shows an increasing pattern in 
quantile for almost all the year. 
Our results suggest that the impact of education on the distribution of wages 
depends on the initial distribution of ability across population and, consequently, 
formal education does not compensate for differences in innate abilities and early 
life conditions. 
 
 
3.5.4 Control Variables across the Wage Distribution 
Results about control variables are in line with previous literature on these 
topics. Difference reflects mainly geographical and sectorial performance in Italy. 
In general, the results show a large degree of heterogeneity also across gender. In 
particular, gains are uniformly larger for men than for women across the whole 
distribution (around 9-17 percent) and for all the year that we consider in the 
analysis. 
Considering the geographical residence of the workers and the sector of 
employment, differences in estimates mainly reflect territorial and sectorial 
performance of Italy. It is more convenient to work in the north regions in 
comparison to the center regions, and the returns decrease with quantile. Instead, 
if an individual works in the south region he will earns less than in the center 
regions. 
Considering different sector of employment, working in the agricultural 
sector is less convenient than working in the industrial sector for almost all the 
quantile across the wage quantile distribution (but for year 1995 and year 2000, 
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we find significant positive effect for working in agricultural sector at high 
quantile). 
Finally, we find a wage gap in favor of public sector employees. 
 
 
3.6 Concluding Remarks 
In this chapter, we present evidence of heterogeneous returns to education 
over the wage distribution. We estimate causal link between education and wages 
at different quantiles of the conditional distribution of wages. The results provide 
evidence that there is not unique causal effect of schooling and that for each 
individual the effect depends on his position in the wage distribution and his 
unobservable wage determinants, such as ability.  
The IVQR estimates show that returns to schooling vary substantially over 
the wage distribution. This means that returns to education are heterogeneous and 
the shape of the estimated returns over the quantiles are different and also different 
for each year of the sample period. In particular, taking into account the 
endogeneity of schooling, we observe that returns to education show an increasing 
pattern in the quantile index. If we interpret the quantile index as a measure of 
unobserved individual ability (Chernozhukov, Hasen and Janson, 2007), our 
results suggest that more able individuals profit more from one additional year of 
education. This means that more able individuals acquire more schooling because 
of higher marginal benefits. 
According to our results, education should have an inequality-increasing 
effect over time, because individuals with high ability, those at the upper quantile 
of the wage distribution, seem to profit more from formal education. Therefore, 
considering also the endogeneity of the schooling variable, we confirm for Italy a 
previous result in the literature for other developed countries. Our results are in 
contrast with the ordinary quantile estimates of return to education in Martins and 
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Pereira (2014) for Italy that do not show any increasing or decreasing pattern 
across the quantile. 
Finally, this analysis shows that estimates of the average return to education 
do not provide a complete characterization of the impact of education on labor 
market outcomes. Instrumental quantile regression methods is an appropriate tool 
to describe the impact of education on wages distribution, controlling for 
unobserved heterogeneity. Our results suggest that the impact of education on the 
distribution of wages depends on the initial distribution of ability across 
population and, as a consequence, formal education does not compensate for 
differences in innate abilities and early life conditions. Our findings contributes 
to a growing literature estimating heterogeneous effects of education. By 
illustrating an application of the IVQR approach in Italy our results highlights the 
importance in looking beyond the average causal effects of the variables of main 
interest in empirical analysis of the estimation of the return to education. 
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Appendix A to Chapter 1 
A.1 Some Descriptive Statistics of the Sample 
Figure A.1 – Mean of the Log of hourly wages less tax (1995 -2012) 
 
Figure A.2 – Mean of the number of year of Schooling (1995 -2012) 
 
Figure A.3 – Mean of the number of year of Experience (1995 -2012) 
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A.2 OLS Estimates 
Table A.1 shows OLS estimates, obtained by including in the original 
specification controls for the composition of her/his family, the geographical area 
of residence and the sector in which the individual is currently working.  
 
 
Table A.1 - OLS estimates. Dependent Variable: log of hourly wages less tax. Omitted categories 
are: Center (DUMMY_CENTER); Industrial sector (DUMMY_INDUSTRIAL). 
VARIABLES 1995 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 
          
SCHOOL 0.0514*** 0.0447*** 0.0425*** 0.0454*** 0.0409*** 0.0451*** 0.0441*** 0.0416*** 0.0377*** 
 (0.00173) (0.00315) (0.00188) (0.00229) (0.00224) (0.00196) (0.00229) (0.00214) (0.00214) 
EXPERIENCE 0.0272*** 0.0275*** 0.0255*** 0.0271*** 0.0210*** 0.0250*** 0.0274*** 0.0194*** 0.0221*** 
 (0.00277) (0.00458) (0.00246) (0.00285) (0.00300) (0.00268) (0.00275) (0.00249) (0.00285) 
EXPERIENCE^2 -0.000352*** -0.000351*** -0.000365*** -0.000362*** -0.000308*** -0.000386*** -0.000405*** -0.000207*** -0.000226*** 
 (6.82e-05) (0.000114) (6.05e-05) (7.46e-05) (8.14e-05) (6.75e-05) (7.15e-05) (6.20e-05) (6.73e-05) 
DUMMY_MALE 0.0855*** 0.0422 0.0785*** 0.106*** 0.0790*** 0.0905*** 0.112*** 0.117*** 0.0654*** 
 (0.0155) (0.0282) (0.0137) (0.0163) (0.0174) (0.0159) (0.0143) (0.0143) (0.0165) 
DUMMY_MARRIED 0.0739*** 0.0666** 0.105*** 0.0617*** 0.0702*** 0.0536*** 0.0312** 0.0684*** 0.0476*** 
 (0.0165) (0.0331) (0.0148) (0.0191) (0.0180) (0.0161) (0.0157) (0.0153) (0.0175) 
NCOMP -0.00338 0.00475 -0.0104* -0.00937 -0.0122* 0.0140** 0.00783 -0.00193 0.0179** 
 (0.00535) (0.0105) (0.00550) (0.00653) (0.00665) (0.00654) (0.00573) (0.00609) (0.00705) 
DUMMY_HOUSEHOLD 0.0436*** 0.0463 0.0325** 0.0381** 0.0385** 0.0651*** 0.0503*** 0.0168 0.0268* 
 (0.0167) (0.0285) (0.0134) (0.0159) (0.0165) (0.0147) (0.0135) (0.0128) (0.0144) 
DUMMY_TOWN 0.0333* 0.0209 0.0457** -0.0369 0.0233 0.0587*** 0.0280 -0.0120 0.0152 
 (0.0175) (0.0340) (0.0178) (0.0278) (0.0313) (0.0215) (0.0243) (0.0240) (0.0296) 
DUMMY_NORTH 0.0404*** 0.0778*** 0.0479*** 0.0398** 0.0473** -0.00852 -0.0296* 0.0441*** 0.0249 
 (0.0140) (0.0241) (0.0136) (0.0169) (0.0198) (0.0160) (0.0164) (0.0170) (0.0179) 
DUMMY_SOUTH -0.0379** 0.0570** -0.0293 0.00369 -0.0233 -0.0821*** -0.0783*** -3.96e-05 -0.0216 
 (0.0172) (0.0288) (0.0189) (0.0232) (0.0241) (0.0188) (0.0186) (0.0189) (0.0210) 
DUMMY_AGRICULTURAL -0.117* -0.0967 -0.131*** -0.0424 -0.0935*** -0.168*** -0.00792 -0.0596 -0.0701 
 (0.0679) (0.0705) (0.0437) (0.0568) (0.0329) (0.0480) (0.0419) (0.0388) (0.0518) 
DUMMY_PUBLIC 0.174*** 0.109*** 0.108*** 0.110*** 0.141*** 0.126*** 0.143*** 0.148*** 0.128*** 
 (0.0168) (0.0268) (0.0150) (0.0182) (0.0197) (0.0188) (0.0190) (0.0176) (0.0212) 
DUMMY_OTHER_SECTOR 0.0109 -0.00144 0.0288* 0.0103 0.00798 0.000915 -0.00276 0.0159 -0.0460*** 
 (0.0149) (0.0301) (0.0152) (0.0177) (0.0189) (0.0161) (0.0160) (0.0146) (0.0169) 
DUMMY_SECT_PARENTS 0.00296 0.0797*** 0.0176 0.0139 0.00659 -0.00164 0.0340*** 0.0113 0.00327 
 (0.0151) (0.0228) (0.0121) (0.0157) (0.0146) (0.0135) (0.0131) (0.0133) (0.0153) 
DUMMY_PART_TIME 0.0734** 0.0348 0.0475* -0.0834** -0.0480 -0.00720 0.0260 -0.00241 -0.0312 
 (0.0324) (0.0527) (0.0267) (0.0367) (0.0310) (0.0301) (0.0268) (0.0215) (0.0230) 
Constant 1.173*** 1.192*** 1.309*** 1.280*** 1.437*** 1.342*** 1.307*** 1.360*** 1.340*** 
 (0.0408) (0.0708) (0.0354) (0.0420) (0.0460) (0.0438) (0.0437) (0.0459) (0.0462) 
          
Observations 6,066 2,016 5,724 5,461 5,425 5,378 5,409 5,161 4,975 
R-squared 0.450 0.366 0.353 0.306 0.261 0.326 0.353 0.327 0.314 
Robust standard errors in parenthesis 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table A.2 shows OLS estimates of the empirical specification, including 
interaction of the variable schooling with experience and with gender.  
 
 
Table A.2 - OLS estimates with interactions. Dependent Variable: log of hourly wages less tax. 
Omitted categories are: Center (DUMMY_CENTER); Industrial sector 
(DUMMY_INDUSTRIAL).  
VARIABLES 1995 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 
          
SCHOOL 0.0471*** 0.0445*** 0.0291*** 0.0388*** 0.0420*** 0.0267*** 0.0242*** 0.0330*** 0.0251*** 
 (0.00663) (0.0108) (0.00625) (0.00831) (0.00657) (0.00555) (0.00553) (0.00539) (0.00620) 
EXPERIENCE 0.0216*** 0.0455*** 0.00857 0.0158* 0.0199*** 0.00515 -0.000317 0.00709 0.0203** 
 (0.00810) (0.0138) (0.00760) (0.00923) (0.00772) (0.00846) (0.00880) (0.00714) (0.00837) 
EXPERIENCE^2 -0.000294 -0.000970*** -6.86e-05 -0.000172 -0.000413** -0.000174 0.000133 -0.000119 -0.000474** 
 (0.000196) (0.000344) (0.000183) (0.000229) (0.000199) (0.000219) (0.000228) (0.000177) (0.000193) 
SCHOOL*EXPER 0.000492 -0.00170 0.00138** 0.000930 -5.80e-07 0.00155** 0.00230*** 0.000961 3.08e-05 
 (0.000704) (0.00112) (0.000640) (0.000824) (0.000702) (0.000678) (0.000700) (0.000590) (0.000696) 
SCHOOL*EXPER^2 -4.17e-06 5.86e-05* -2.29e-05 -1.48e-05 1.22e-05 -1.33e-05 -4.39e-05** -5.10e-06 2.45e-05 
 (1.78e-05) (3.04e-05) (1.60e-05) (2.13e-05) (1.85e-05) (1.81e-05) (1.82e-05) (1.51e-05) (1.64e-05) 
DUMMY_MALE 0.129*** -0.0536 0.102** 0.173*** 0.200*** 0.146*** 0.136*** 0.236*** 0.0299 
 (0.0432) (0.0821) (0.0435) (0.0568) (0.0505) (0.0439) (0.0483) (0.0474) (0.0534) 
SCHOOL*MALE -0.00403 0.00848 -0.00222 -0.00589 -0.0106** -0.00499 -0.00203 -0.00996** 0.00302 
 (0.00360) (0.00645) (0.00365) (0.00482) (0.00426) (0.00361) (0.00418) (0.00395) (0.00416) 
DUMMY_MARRIED 0.0732*** 0.0700** 0.105*** 0.0611*** 0.0703*** 0.0572*** 0.0286* 0.0658*** 0.0476*** 
 (0.0166) (0.0323) (0.0148) (0.0190) (0.0182) (0.0161) (0.0156) (0.0153) (0.0175) 
NCOMP -0.00398 0.00307 -0.0114** -0.00998 -0.0130* 0.0133** 0.00836 -0.00200 0.0164** 
 (0.00537) (0.0105) (0.00546) (0.00646) (0.00664) (0.00653) (0.00571) (0.00606) (0.00701) 
DUMMY_HOUSEHOLD 0.0441*** 0.0438 0.0332** 0.0392** 0.0391** 0.0624*** 0.0491*** 0.0172 0.0245* 
 (0.0168) (0.0281) (0.0134) (0.0160) (0.0165) (0.0146) (0.0135) (0.0127) (0.0144) 
DUMMY_TOWN 0.0317* 0.0142 0.0464*** -0.0388 0.0216 0.0585*** 0.0265 -0.0177 0.0119 
 (0.0175) (0.0342) (0.0178) (0.0278) (0.0312) (0.0214) (0.0241) (0.0239) (0.0296) 
DUMMY_NORTH 0.0399*** 0.0745*** 0.0467*** 0.0402** 0.0481** -0.0101 -0.0320* 0.0436*** 0.0245 
 (0.0140) (0.0238) (0.0136) (0.0169) (0.0198) (0.0159) (0.0164) (0.0168) (0.0179) 
DUMMY_SOUTH -0.0416** 0.0563* -0.0324* 0.00143 -0.0274 -0.0864*** -0.0825*** -0.00393 -0.0225 
 (0.0172) (0.0287) (0.0189) (0.0232) (0.0237) (0.0188) (0.0185) (0.0186) (0.0210) 
DUMMY_AGRICULTURAL -0.116* -0.108 -0.128*** -0.0434 -0.0942*** -0.173*** -0.00883 -0.0568 -0.0747 
 (0.0686) (0.0679) (0.0440) (0.0567) (0.0331) (0.0482) (0.0421) (0.0384) (0.0503) 
DUMMY_PUBLIC 0.173*** 0.111*** 0.104*** 0.106*** 0.138*** 0.120*** 0.140*** 0.141*** 0.121*** 
 (0.0169) (0.0268) (0.0150) (0.0181) (0.0197) (0.0187) (0.0191) (0.0174) (0.0213) 
DUMMY_OTHER_SECTOR 0.00895 -0.00335 0.0275* 0.0107 0.0108 -3.01e-05 -0.00259 0.0144 -0.0480*** 
 (0.0151) (0.0301) (0.0150) (0.0179) (0.0190) (0.0161) (0.0158) (0.0145) (0.0170) 
DUMMY_SECT_PARENTS 0.00368 0.0778*** 0.0179 0.0146 0.00648 0.00102 0.0354*** 0.0122 0.00324 
 (0.0151) (0.0225) (0.0121) (0.0157) (0.0146) (0.0135) (0.0132) (0.0131) (0.0152) 
DUMMY_PART_TIME 0.0763** 0.0280 0.0505* -0.0794** -0.0440 -0.00747 0.0251 -0.000550 -0.0349 
 (0.0325) (0.0519) (0.0264) (0.0369) (0.0312) (0.0300) (0.0268) (0.0215) (0.0228) 
Constant 1.225*** 1.209*** 1.478*** 1.362*** 1.432*** 1.575*** 1.553*** 1.472*** 1.513*** 
 (0.0821) (0.144) (0.0764) (0.0980) (0.0819) (0.0812) (0.0766) (0.0773) (0.0793) 
          
Observations 6,066 2,016 5,724 5,461 5,425 5,378 5,409 5,161 4,975 
R-squared 0.451 0.371 0.356 0.308 0.264 0.334 0.358 0.333 0.324 
Robust standard errors in parenthesis 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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A.3 First Stage Regression of IV Estimates 
Table A.3 shows the estimates of the first stage regression of the instrumental 
variables estimation. 
 
 
Table A.3 – First stage of IV estimates. Dependent Variable: schooling. Omitted categories are: 
Center (DUMMY_CENTER); Industrial sector (DUMMY_INDUSTRIAL). 
VARIABLES 1995 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 
          
SCHOOL_F 0.296*** 0.292*** 0.298*** 0.267*** 0.237*** 0.261*** 0.260*** 0.281*** 0.248*** 
 (0.0213) (0.0393) (0.0248) (0.0253) (0.0240) (0.0247) (0.0289) (0.0431) (0.0348) 
SCHOOL_M 0.216*** 0.207*** 0.150*** 0.172*** 0.189*** 0.135*** 0.183*** 0.145*** 0.159*** 
 (0.0254) (0.0513) (0.0284) (0.0290) (0.0261) (0.0285) (0.0332) (0.0433) (0.0371) 
EXPERIENCE 0.0363 -0.0374 -0.0130 -0.00816 -0.0495 -0.0453 -0.0308 -0.0588 -0.00311 
 (0.0268) (0.0492) (0.0305) (0.0350) (0.0302) (0.0297) (0.0311) (0.0449) (0.0419) 
EXPERIENCE^2 -0.00226*** 0.000500 -0.000833 -0.000699 0.000762 -0.000104 -0.000199 0.000484 -0.000570 
 (0.000662) (0.00118) (0.000740) (0.000844) (0.000727) (0.000696) (0.000718) (0.00101) (0.000910) 
DUMMY_MALE 0.269 0.409 -0.317* -0.411** -0.395** -0.310 -0.333 -0.592*** -0.412** 
 (0.195) (0.340) (0.172) (0.190) (0.174) (0.193) (0.202) (0.219) (0.209) 
DUMMY_MARRIED 0.510** -0.428 -0.0373 0.294 0.618*** 0.418** 0.792*** -0.0912 0.0893 
 (0.246) (0.419) (0.243) (0.251) (0.221) (0.209) (0.251) (0.250) (0.250) 
NCOMP -0.169*** -0.196* -0.0204 0.0844 -0.0318 -0.0220 -0.170** 0.226** 0.0448 
 (0.0643) (0.114) (0.0755) (0.0777) (0.0754) (0.0732) (0.0784) (0.0980) (0.0935) 
DUMMY_HOUSEHOLD -0.168 -0.629* 0.188 -0.0163 0.109 0.177 0.0701   
 (0.199) (0.344) (0.165) (0.181) (0.171) (0.180) (0.218)   
DUMMY_TOWN 0.223 -0.179 0.908*** 0.531** 0.110 0.398* 0.348 0.435 0.717** 
 (0.189) (0.354) (0.209) (0.247) (0.216) (0.225) (0.273) (0.292) (0.323) 
DUMMY_NORTH -0.158 0.0635 0.238 0.378** 0.0239 -0.235 0.173 -0.252 -0.453* 
 (0.159) (0.268) (0.168) (0.181) (0.172) (0.179) (0.214) (0.247) (0.248) 
DUMMY_SOUTH -0.197 0.0832 0.0470 0.310 -0.315 -0.622*** -0.240 -0.281 -0.340 
 (0.177) (0.293) (0.190) (0.225) (0.222) (0.212) (0.240) (0.304) (0.291) 
DUMMY_AGRICULTURAL -1.372*** -2.769*** -1.473*** -1.443*** -1.327*** -0.756** -1.060*** -1.098* -0.958** 
 (0.466) (0.562) (0.373) (0.332) (0.335) (0.312) (0.397) (0.636) (0.382) 
DUMMY_PUBLIC 2.465*** 2.268*** 2.551*** 2.454*** 2.520*** 2.491*** 2.423*** 2.235*** 2.529*** 
 (0.177) (0.285) (0.175) (0.205) (0.192) (0.175) (0.201) (0.294) (0.274) 
DUMMY_OTHER_SECTOR 0.00794 0.473 0.800*** 0.501*** 0.866*** 0.715*** 0.645*** 0.643*** 0.521** 
 (0.159) (0.300) (0.172) (0.176) (0.180) (0.176) (0.192) (0.229) (0.229) 
DUMMY_SECT_PARENTS 0.154 0.273 0.291** -0.160 0.183 0.393*** 0.193 -0.0290 0.255 
 (0.151) (0.218) (0.135) (0.151) (0.139) (0.144) (0.163) (0.204) (0.187) 
DUMMY_PART_TIME -0.629*** -0.656* -0.594** -0.528** -0.825*** -0.857*** -0.599** -0.822** -0.651** 
 (0.228) (0.378) (0.232) (0.262) (0.248) (0.237) (0.295) (0.411) (0.265) 
          
Constant 7.434*** 8.901*** 7.903*** 7.570*** 7.969*** 8.906*** 8.516*** 9.259*** 8.996*** 
 (0.385) (0.732) (0.399) (0.467) (0.412) (0.423) (0.461) (0.599) (0.548) 
          
Observations 4,352 1,468 3,783 3,321 3,405 3,437 2,836 2,145 2,112 
R-squared 0.408 0.408 0.390 0.373 0.365 0.365 0.364 0.322 0.338 
Sargan test χ2(1) 1.691 1.891 0.239 0.05 0.515 0.197 0.026 0.457 0.868 
p-Value 0.1935 0.1691 0.6248 0.8239 0.473 0.657 0.8716 0.5038 0.3516 
F-test on excl. instrum. 461.28 147.101 288.83 201.88 225.05 195.76 188.55 107,67 106.27 
p-Value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.0000 
Robust standard errors in parenthesis 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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A.4 First Step in the Ordered Probit 
Table A.4 reports the results of the ordered probit model for educational 
attainment as a function of the instrument used in the IV estimation. This is the 
first step necessary to estimate the score associated to the ordered probit that we 
add in the wages equation in order to apply ordinary least squares as second step.  
 
 
Table A.4 – Ordered probit estimates. Dependent Variable: education. Omitted categories are: 
Center (DUMMY_CENTER); Industrial sector (DUMMY_INDUSTRIAL).  
VARIABLES 1995 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 
          
PRIMARY_F -0.836*** -0.950*** -0.716*** -0.586*** -0.628*** -0.677*** -0.725*** -0.564*** -0.523*** 
 (0.0653) (0.109) (0.0762) (0.0774) (0.0700) (0.0735) (0.0807) (0.0912) (0.0819) 
PRIMARY_M -0.495*** -0.375*** -0.421*** -0.553*** -0.436*** -0.293*** -0.453*** -0.280*** -0.468*** 
 (0.0729) (0.120) (0.0834) (0.0838) (0.0784) (0.0775) (0.0848) (0.0989) (0.0847) 
EXPERIENCE 0.00682 -0.0205 -0.0171 -0.0141 -0.0386*** -0.0194 -0.0130 -0.0178 0.00268 
 (0.0102) (0.0189) (0.0111) (0.0133) (0.0121) (0.0125) (0.0127) (0.0157) (0.0165) 
EXPERIENCE^2 -0.000571** 0.000449 0.000122 8.38e-05 0.000782*** 3.84e-05 3.19e-05 0.000118 -0.000270 
 (0.000254) (0.000449) (0.000272) (0.000319) (0.000283) (0.000301) (0.000294) (0.000364) (0.000358) 
DUMMY_MALE 0.0436 0.113 -0.177*** -0.147** -0.175** -0.115 -0.137* -0.240*** -0.179** 
 (0.0738) (0.140) (0.0648) (0.0718) (0.0687) (0.0810) (0.0766) (0.0805) (0.0806) 
DUMMY_MARRIED 0.194** -0.188 0.0600 0.112 0.292*** 0.130 0.343*** -0.0254 0.0954 
 (0.0983) (0.159) (0.0881) (0.0985) (0.0896) (0.0869) (0.0979) (0.0946) (0.0977) 
NCOMP -0.0637** -0.117*** -0.00877 0.0137 -0.0325 -0.0213 -0.0470 0.0634* 0.00537 
 (0.0247) (0.0443) (0.0263) (0.0304) (0.0302) (0.0308) (0.0312) (0.0364) (0.0354) 
DUMMY_HOUSEHOLD -0.0893 -0.320** 0.0640 -0.0679 0.0225 0.0290 0.0406   
 (0.0749) (0.140) (0.0624) (0.0698) (0.0681) (0.0792) (0.0856)   
DUMMY_TOWN 0.113 0.0415 0.297*** 0.194** 0.0734 0.220** 0.149 0.190* 0.263** 
 (0.0703) (0.126) (0.0784) (0.0957) (0.0901) (0.0885) (0.102) (0.106) (0.116) 
DUMMY_NORTH -0.0315 -0.0375 0.142** 0.148** 0.0360 -0.130* 0.0132 -0.103 -0.183** 
 (0.0614) (0.100) (0.0643) (0.0729) (0.0715) (0.0724) (0.0830) (0.0889) (0.0888) 
DUMMY_SOUTH -0.0787 0.0318 0.0541 0.0981 -0.135 -0.292*** -0.196** -0.192* -0.170 
 (0.0675) (0.106) (0.0705) (0.0876) (0.0868) (0.0877) (0.0941) (0.106) (0.105) 
DUMMY_AGRICULTURAL -0.426** -1.420*** -0.407*** -0.564*** -0.770*** -0.528*** -0.463** -0.334 -0.591** 
 (0.191) (0.282) (0.151) (0.199) (0.183) (0.167) (0.186) (0.251) (0.234) 
DUMMY_PUBLIC 0.929*** 0.749*** 0.950*** 0.977*** 0.987*** 0.991*** 0.922*** 0.892*** 0.967*** 
 (0.0682) (0.113) (0.0646) (0.0760) (0.0760) (0.0736) (0.0790) (0.104) (0.106) 
DUMMY_OTHER_SECT 0.0287 0.0758 0.297*** 0.255*** 0.342*** 0.309*** 0.285*** 0.298*** 0.236*** 
 (0.0651) (0.116) (0.0670) (0.0720) (0.0735) (0.0709) (0.0775) (0.0869) (0.0902) 
DUMMY_SECT_PARENTS 0.0724 0.127 0.136*** -0.00329 0.117** 0.222*** 0.110* 0.0442 0.110 
 (0.0616) (0.0843) (0.0505) (0.0592) (0.0560) (0.0585) (0.0629) (0.0734) (0.0713) 
DUMMY_PART_TIME -0.264** -0.333** -0.169* -0.151 -0.235** -0.292*** -0.194* -0.327** -0.229** 
 (0.104) (0.157) (0.0918) (0.108) (0.0968) (0.0960) (0.111) (0.141) (0.101) 
          
Constant cut1 -1.009*** -1.807*** -0.830*** -0.796*** -0.917*** -1.076*** -0.985*** -1.079*** -1.020*** 
 (0.153) (0.260) (0.152) (0.174) (0.163) (0.172) (0.175) (0.201) (0.219) 
Constant cut2 -0.771*** -1.549*** -0.519*** -0.520*** -0.644*** -0.757*** -0.664*** -0.705*** -0.640*** 
 (0.153) (0.258) (0.152) (0.173) (0.162) (0.174) (0.177) (0.201) (0.219) 
Constant cut3 0.649*** -0.163 0.818*** 0.858*** 0.816*** 0.702*** 0.748*** 0.575*** 0.677*** 
 (0.153) (0.255) (0.152) (0.175) (0.165) (0.178) (0.182) (0.199) (0.215) 
          
Observations 4,352 1,468 3,783 3,321 3,405 3,437 2,836 2,145 2,112 
Robust standard errors in parenthesis 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Appendix B to Chapter 2 
B.1 GAM Estimation 
A Generalized Additive Model (Hastie and Tibshirani, 1986, 1990) is a 
generalized linear model with a linear predictor involving a sum of smooth 
functions of covariates. In general, the model has a structure something like: 
g(μi) = Xi
∗θ + f1(x1i) + f2(x2i) + f3(x3i, x4i) + ⋯, (B.1) 
Where: 
μi ≡ E(Yi) and Yi~some exponential family distribution 
Yi is a response variable, Xi
∗ is a row of the model matrix for any strictly parametric 
model components, θ is the corresponding parameter vector, and the fj are smooth 
functions of the covariate, xk. 
The model allows for rather flexible specification of the dependence of the 
response on the covariates, but specifying the model only in terms of “smooth 
functions”, rather than detailed parametric relationships, it is possible to avoid 
cumbersome and unwieldy models. This flexibility and convenience comes to the 
cost of two new theoretical problems. It is necessary both to represent the smooth 
functions is some way and to choose how smooth they should be. 
We estimate the model (2.2) following the method described in Wood 
(2011), and implemented by the package mgcv in R. The estimation is obtained 
by penalized likelihood maximization. The model is fitted by minimizing: 
‖𝐲−𝐗𝛽‖2 + ∑ 𝛾𝑘 ∫ [𝜇𝑘
′′(𝑥)]2 𝑑𝑥
+∞
−∞
𝐾
𝑘=1
 (B.2) 
where 𝐲 is the vector of observations, 𝐗 is the matrix of explanatory variables, 𝛽 
is a vector of parameters to be estimated, 𝛾𝑘,𝑘 = 1, … , 𝐾 are smoothing 
parameters, and the penalty, which controls the smoothness of the estimate, is 
82 
 
represented by the integrated square of the second derivatives of the smooth terms. 
The vector of parameters originates from expressing every smooth term in model 
(2.2), 𝜇𝑘(∙), as: 
𝜇𝑘(𝑥) = ∑ 𝑏𝑙(𝑥)𝛽𝑙
𝑞
𝑙=1
 (B.3) 
 
where 𝑏𝑙(𝑥) are basis functions and q is their number. 
Parameters 𝛽 are chosen to minimize the function in Equation (B.2) for given 
values of the smoothing parameters 𝛾𝑘. Smoothing parameters are, in turn, chosen 
by the minimization of the restricted maximum likelihood (REML) score. 
Estimation proceeds by penalized iteratively re-weighted least squares (P-IRLS), 
until convergence in the estimates is reached. 
 
 
B.2 Bootstrap Procedure to Compute Confidence Intervals 
Since the second-stage regression contains generated regressors (i.e. the 
first-stage residuals), to obtain the appropriate standard errors we use the 
following bootstrap procedure. Given a sample of observations (y, X, Z), where y 
is the vector of dimension N of dependent variable, X is the N×K matrix of 
explanatory variables (including the endogenous variable), and Z is the N×K 
matrix of instruments: 
1. select a bootstrap sample (𝑦𝑏
∗, 𝑋𝑏
∗, 𝑍𝑏
∗)  drawn with replacement from (y, X, 
Z); 
2. run a semiparametric regression of the endogenous variable on the 
exogenous variables and the instruments; 
3. insert the first-stage residuals in the original semiparametric regression; 
4. repeat B = 1000 times points 1-3; 
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5. for each estimated parametric coefficients compute the corresponding 
equal-tail bootstrap p-value (see Davidson and MacKinnon (2007)): 
 
𝑃∗(?̂?) = 2 ∗ min (
1
𝐵
∑ #{?̂?𝑏
∗ ≤ 0}
𝐵
𝑏=1
,
1
𝐵
∑ #{?̂?𝑏
∗ > 0}
𝐵
𝑏=1
) (B.4) 
6. for each estimated non-parametric coefficients compute the average partial 
effect and the 95 percent confidence bands. 
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B.3 Linear Model with Control Function Estimates 
Table B.1 - First Stage LM estimates. Dependent Variable: log of hourly wages less tax. 
Omitted categories are: Center (DUMMY_CENTER); Industrial sector 
(DUMMY_INDUSTRIAL), 1995-2012. 
 
 
 
 
Table B.2 - Second Stage LM estimates. Dependent Variable: log of hourly wages less 
tax. Omitted categories are: Center (DUMMY_CENTER); Industrial sector 
(DUMMY_INDUSTRIAL), 1995-2012. 
 
 
 
 
Parametric coefficients:
Constant 7,5023 *** 8,9688 *** 7,9623 *** 7,5281 *** 7,9987 *** 8,9869 *** 8,5361 *** 9,2506 *** 9,0686 ***
SCHOOL_F 0,2960 *** 0,2932 *** 0,3008 *** 0,2654 *** 0,2394 *** 0,2663 *** 0,2628 *** 0,2813 *** 0,2501 ***
SCHOOL_M 0,2176 *** 0,2144 *** 0,1537 *** 0,1693 *** 0,1918 *** 0,1385 *** 0,1853 *** 0,1445 *** 0,1637 ***
EXPERIENCE 0,0361 * -0,0391 -0,0091 -0,0085 -0,0480 ** -0,0429 ** -0,0285 -0,0588 ** -0,0025
EXPERIENCE^2 -0,0023 *** 0,0005 -0,0009 * -0,0007 0,0007 -0,0001 -0,0003 0,0005 -0,0006
DUMMY_MALE 0,2674 * 0,4095 -0,3024 ** -0,4119 *** -0,3978 *** -0,3277 ** -0,3265 ** -0,5919 *** -0,4209 ***
DUMMY_MARRIED 0,5250 *** -0,3986 -0,0250 0,2724 0,6338 *** 0,4694 *** 0,7943 *** -0,0911 0,0843
NCOMP -0,1688 *** -0,1909 ** -0,0163 0,0819 -0,0294 -0,0208 -0,1652 *** 0,2258 *** 0,0486
DUMMY_HOUSEHOLD -0,1701 -0,6443 ** 0,1762 -0,0105 0,1133 0,1804 0,0546
DUMMY_TOWN 0,2222 -0,1761 0,9159 *** 0,5292 *** 0,1141 0,4326 *** 0,3596 ** 0,4355 ** 0,7292 ***
DUMMY_NORTH -0,1524 0,0574 0,2331 * 0,3815 *** 0,0240 -0,2544 * 0,1839 -0,2510 -0,4748 ***
DUMMY_SOUTH -0,1973 0,0841 0,0459 0,3059 * -0,3154 * -0,6324 *** -0,2380 -0,2783 -0,3545 *
DUMMY_AGRICULTURAL -1,3261 *** -2,7019 *** -1,4081 *** -1,4715 *** -1,2805 *** -0,6751 ** -1,0124 *** -1,1045 *** -0,9089 **
DUMMY_PUBLIC 2,3773 *** 2,2571 *** 2,5076 *** 2,4837 *** 2,4847 *** 2,4360 *** 2,4034 *** 2,2401 *** 2,4971 ***
DUMMY_OTHER_SECTOR 0,0105 0,5209 ** 0,8101 *** 0,5107 *** 0,8757 *** 0,7378 *** 0,6541 *** 0,6453 *** 0,5114 ***
DUMMY_PART_TIME -0,6396 *** -0,6406 ** -0,6110 *** -0,5200 *** -0,8130 *** -0,8624 *** -0,5888 *** -0,8230 *** -0,6506 ***
Estimate Estimate Estimate Estimate
(***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1)
Estimate Estimate Estimate Estimate Estimate
1995 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012
Parametric coefficients:
Constant 1,1280 *** 1,0736 *** 1,1140 *** 1,0880 *** 1,2435 *** 0,9841 *** 1,1610 *** 1,0820 *** 1,2130 ***
SCHOOL 0,0642 *** 0,0644 *** 0,0681 *** 0,0711 *** 0,0661 *** 0,0778 *** 0,0604 *** 0,0688 *** 0,0532 ***
EXPERIENCE 0,0189 *** 0,0186 *** 0,0207 *** 0,0246 *** 0,0143 *** 0,0249 *** 0,0230 *** 0,0151 *** 0,0169 ***
EXPERIENCE^2 -0,0001 *** -0,0001 -0,0002 *** -0,0003 *** -0,0001 ** -0,0003 *** -0,0003 *** 0,0000 -0,0001
DUMMY_MALE 0,1323 *** 0,1138 *** 0,0959 *** 0,0984 *** 0,0811 *** 0,1096 *** 0,1573 *** 0,1539 *** 0,1007 ***
DUMMY_MARRIED 0,0037 0,0553 0,0556 *** 0,0082 0,0363 . -0,0110 -0,0508 ** 0,0292 0,0088
NCOMP 0,0176 *** 0,0161 -0,0015 0,0012 -0,0024 0,0314 *** 0,0287 *** -0,0023 0,0209 ***
DUMMY_HOUSEHOLD -0,0063 -0,0025 0,0065 0,0226 0,0186 0,0306 ** 0,0064
DUMMY_TOWN 0,0059 0,0318 0,0128 -0,0814 *** -0,0185 0,0414 ** 0,0176 -0,0341 -0,0038
DUMMY_NORTH 0,0376 *** 0,0663 ** 0,0462 *** 0,0456 *** 0,0667 *** -0,0078 -0,0005 0,0512 ** 0,0413 **
DUMMY_SOUTH -0,0239 0,0637 ** -0,0059 0,0062 0,0222 -0,0494 *** -0,0337 * 0,0194 -0,0065
DUMMY_AGRICULTURAL -0,0417 0,0376 -0,1196 *** -0,0410 -0,0698 . -0,1311 *** -0,0513 0,0300 -0,1062 **
DUMMY_PUBLIC 0,1131 *** 0,0361 0,0235 0,0088 0,0563 *** 0,0141 0,0874 *** 0,0655 ** 0,0734 **
DUMMY_OTHER_SECTOR 0,0155 -0,0015 -0,0080 -0,0138 -0,0144 -0,0302 . -0,0015 0,0033 -0,0509 **
DUMMY_PART_TIME 0,0391 * 0,0822 ** 0,0830 *** -0,0605 ** -0,0136 0,0186 0,0157 0,0448 -0,0198
Residual First Stage -0,0149 *** -0,0192 *** -0,0273 *** -0,0268 *** -0,0265 *** -0,0360 *** -0,0168 *** -0,0285 *** -0,0168 ***
Estimate Estimate Estimate Estimate
(***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1)
Estimate Estimate Estimate Estimate Estimate
1995 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012
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Appendix C to Chapter 3 
C.1 Instrumental Variable Quantile Regression Estimates 
Table C.1 - IVQR estimates. Dependent Variable: log of hourly wages less tax. Omitted categories are: 
Center (DUMMY_CENTER); Industrial sector (DUMMY_INDUSTRIAL), 1995-2012, by quantile 
(*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1) 
 
 
0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9
SCHOOL 0,0466 *** 0,0528 *** 0,0584 *** 0,0600 *** 0,0605 *** 0,0635 *** 0,0678 *** 0,0707 *** 0,0753 ***
EXPERIENCE 0,0236 *** 0,0185 *** 0,0150 *** 0,0161 *** 0,0130 *** 0,0114 *** 0,0103 *** 0,0114 *** 0,0085 **
EXPERIENCE^2 -0,0003 *** -0,0002 ** -0,0001 -0,0001 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0001
DUMMY_MALE 0,1232 *** 0,1118 *** 0,0972 *** 0,0938 *** 0,0945 *** 0,1028 *** 0,0898 *** 0,1020 *** 0,1009 ***
DUMMY_MARRIED 0,0662 ** 0,0328 0,0117 0,0123 0,0020 -0,0108 0,0128 0,0173 0,0088
NCOMP 0,0045 0,0168 ** 0,0190 *** 0,0195 *** 0,0228 *** 0,0245 *** 0,0308 *** 0,0295 *** 0,0413 ***
DUMMY_HOUSEHOLD 0,0072 0,0235 0,0233 0,0207 0,0017 -0,0042 0,0055 0,0264 0,0355
DUMMY_TOWN -0,0401 * -0,0394 * 0,0012 0,0042 0,0041 0,0007 0,0171 0,0352 0,0551 *
DUMMY_NORTH 0,0425 ** 0,0420 *** 0,0359 ** 0,0347 ** 0,0308 ** 0,0311 ** 0,0263 * 0,0416 ** 0,0365 *
DUMMY_SOUTH -0,0675 *** -0,0292 -0,0131 -0,0029 0,0102 0,0151 0,0174 0,0216 0,0281
DUMMY_AGRICULTURAL -0,3360 *** -0,2335 *** -0,1581 *** -0,1340 *** -0,1415 *** -0,0767 0,0445 0,1728 *** 0,2708 **
DUMMY_PUBLIC 0,1753 *** 0,1259 *** 0,1061 *** 0,1098 *** 0,1168 *** 0,1229 *** 0,1046 *** 0,1028 *** 0,0986 ***
DUMMY_OTHER_SECTOR -0,0319 -0,0359 ** -0,0147 0,0064 0,0105 0,0252 0,0468 *** 0,0559 *** 0,0760 ***
DUMMY_SECT_PARENTS 0,0346 0,0198 0,0099 0,0145 0,0094 0,0133 -0,0071 -0,0070 -0,0240
DUMMY_PART_TIME -0,0372 0,0131 0,0158 0,0203 0,0137 -0,0011 -0,0053 0,0529 0,1775
Constant 0,9267 *** 0,9949 *** 1,0695 *** 1,1056 *** 1,2049 *** 1,2543 *** 1,2684 *** 1,2790 *** 1,3421 ***
Year 1995
0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9
SCHOOL 0,0651 *** 0,0625 *** 0,0606 *** 0,0559 *** 0,0543 *** 0,0646 *** 0,0602 *** 0,0532 *** 0,0682 ***
EXPERIENCE 0,0279 *** 0,0129 *** 0,0129 *** 0,0149 *** 0,0101 * 0,0103 ** 0,0024 -0,0001 -0,0096
EXPERIENCE^2 -0,0004 ** 0,0000 0,0000 -0,0001 0,0000 0,0000 0,0002 0,0002 0,0005 **
DUMMY_MALE 0,1120 ** 0,1295 *** 0,1319 *** 0,1064 *** 0,1217 *** 0,1209 *** 0,1232 *** 0,1266 *** 0,1647 ***
DUMMY_MARRIED 0,0610 0,0791 0,0607 0,0629 * 0,0670 * 0,0591 0,0078 0,0256 -0,0064
NCOMP 0,0291 ** 0,0149 0,0241 ** 0,0215 ** 0,0141 0,0232 * 0,0208 0,0061 0,0223
DUMMY_HOUSEHOLD -0,0204 0,0186 -0,0107 0,0028 -0,0181 -0,0323 -0,0326 -0,0339 -0,0444
DUMMY_TOWN -0,0343 -0,0172 -0,0523 -0,0505 0,0085 -0,0142 0,0206 0,0151 0,0180
DUMMY_NORTH 0,0449 0,0568 ** 0,0519 ** 0,0477 * 0,0373 0,0065 -0,0015 -0,0116 -0,0037
DUMMY_SOUTH 0,0273 0,0575 * 0,0637 ** 0,0670 ** 0,0648 ** 0,0492 0,0452 0,0292 0,0518
DUMMY_AGRICULTURAL -0,3055 *** -0,1015 -0,1173 -0,0962 -0,0321 0,0350 0,0829 0,0675 0,3333
DUMMY_PUBLIC -0,0075 0,0210 0,0275 0,0320 0,0371 0,0058 0,0453 0,1195 *** 0,0609
DUMMY_OTHER_SECTOR -0,0151 0,0078 -0,0082 -0,0084 0,0097 -0,0366 -0,0176 0,0185 -0,0061
DUMMY_SECT_PARENTS -0,0032 0,0222 0,0220 0,0163 0,0222 0,0251 0,0150 0,0456 * 0,0646 *
DUMMY_PART_TIME -0,0129 0,0003 -0,0086 -0,0319 -0,0311 -0,0365 0,0017 0,0634 0,1041
Constant 0,6725 *** 0,8658 *** 0,9768 *** 1,1153 *** 1,2594 *** 1,2589 *** 1,4993 *** 1,6775 *** 1,7115 ***
Year 1998
0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9
SCHOOL 0,0628 *** 0,0673 *** 0,0635 *** 0,0633 *** 0,0660 *** 0,0669 *** 0,0717 *** 0,0760 *** 0,0845 ***
EXPERIENCE 0,0281 *** 0,0265 *** 0,0219 *** 0,0190 *** 0,0179 *** 0,0181 *** 0,0148 *** 0,0154 *** 0,0089 *
EXPERIENCE^2 -0,0004 *** -0,0003 *** -0,0002 *** -0,0002 ** -0,0001 ** -0,0002 ** -0,0001 -0,0001 0,0001
DUMMY_MALE 0,1162 *** 0,1067 *** 0,1029 *** 0,1050 *** 0,1098 *** 0,1327 *** 0,1460 *** 0,1436 *** 0,1436 ***
DUMMY_MARRIED 0,0767 *** 0,0601 *** 0,0471 ** 0,0352 * 0,0247 0,0138 0,0235 0,0420 * 0,0442
NCOMP -0,0093 -0,0046 0,0072 0,0179 *** 0,0180 *** 0,0155 ** 0,0143 ** 0,0151 * 0,0120
DUMMY_HOUSEHOLD -0,0108 -0,0035 -0,0040 0,0091 0,0129 -0,0050 -0,0079 -0,0069 0,0057
DUMMY_TOWN -0,0329 0,0164 0,0330 0,0271 0,0277 0,0092 0,0289 0,0478 * 0,0520
DUMMY_NORTH 0,0868 *** 0,0655 *** 0,0476 *** 0,0402 *** 0,0494 *** 0,0594 *** 0,0591 *** 0,0575 *** 0,0700 ***
DUMMY_SOUTH -0,0408 -0,0271 -0,0195 -0,0190 0,0108 0,0134 0,0284 0,0618 *** 0,0940 ***
DUMMY_AGRICULTURAL -0,2117 ** -0,0915 * -0,1045 ** -0,0823 ** -0,0665 * -0,0361 0,0535 0,0930 * 0,1909 **
DUMMY_PUBLIC 0,0263 0,0145 0,0276 0,0395 ** 0,0361 ** 0,0439 ** 0,0377 ** 0,0264 0,0110
DUMMY_OTHER_SECTOR -0,0358 -0,0135 -0,0146 0,0026 0,0163 0,0263 * 0,0365 ** 0,0305 0,0274
DUMMY_SECT_PARENTS -0,0032 -0,0034 0,0005 0,0013 -0,0106 -0,0196 * -0,0293 ** -0,0418 *** -0,0536 ***
DUMMY_PART_TIME -0,0102 0,0060 -0,0126 -0,0182 0,0012 0,0051 0,0304 0,1062 ** 0,1714 ***
Constant 0,7717 *** 0,8305 *** 0,9893 *** 1,0556 *** 1,0959 *** 1,1596 *** 1,2017 *** 1,2352 *** 1,3426 ***
Year 2000
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0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9
SCHOOL 0,0487 *** 0,0576 *** 0,0608 *** 0,0636 *** 0,0667 *** 0,0688 *** 0,0711 *** 0,0724 *** 0,0844 ***
EXPERIENCE 0,0232 *** 0,0203 *** 0,0216 *** 0,0166 *** 0,0153 *** 0,0167 *** 0,0160 *** 0,0100 *** 0,0089
EXPERIENCE^2 -0,0003 *** -0,0002 *** -0,0003 *** -0,0001 * -0,0001 -0,0001 * -0,0001 0,0000 0,0001
DUMMY_MALE 0,0824 *** 0,1008 *** 0,1064 *** 0,1033 *** 0,0997 *** 0,1056 *** 0,1122 *** 0,1326 *** 0,1709 ***
DUMMY_MARRIED 0,0431 * 0,0272 0,0160 0,0057 -0,0019 -0,0110 -0,0170 -0,0267 -0,0704 **
NCOMP -0,0002 0,0088 0,0141 ** 0,0146 ** 0,0147 ** 0,0132 0,0100 0,0216 ** 0,0265 **
DUMMY_HOUSEHOLD 0,0404 ** 0,0227 0,0193 0,0114 0,0000 0,0076 0,0061 0,0158 -0,0135
DUMMY_TOWN -0,0789 * -0,0206 -0,0201 -0,0396 * -0,0548 ** -0,0526 * -0,0096 -0,0305 -0,0226
DUMMY_NORTH 0,0793 *** 0,0489 ** 0,0345 ** 0,0474 *** 0,0457 *** 0,0453 ** 0,0219 0,0161 0,0177
DUMMY_SOUTH -0,0079 -0,0150 -0,0177 -0,0064 -0,0001 0,0137 0,0298 0,0144 0,0244
DUMMY_AGRICULTURAL -0,2478 *** -0,1222 *** -0,1403 *** -0,0943 ** -0,0743 ** -0,0643 -0,0362 -0,0424 0,0121
DUMMY_PUBLIC 0,0366 0,0249 0,0202 0,0272 0,0325 0,0269 0,0462 * 0,0439 * -0,0067
DUMMY_OTHER_SECTOR -0,0408 * -0,0489 ** -0,0147 0,0021 0,0093 0,0016 0,0193 0,0299 0,0536 *
DUMMY_SECT_PARENTS -0,0055 -0,0035 0,0209 0,0127 0,0048 0,0144 0,0211 0,0172 -0,0387 *
DUMMY_PART_TIME -0,0716 -0,0267 -0,0331 -0,0174 -0,0098 0,0087 0,0110 0,0143 0,0392
Constant 0,9525 *** 1,0030 *** 1,0249 *** 1,1191 *** 1,1754 *** 1,2089 *** 1,2745 *** 1,3746 *** 1,4660 ***
Year 2002
0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9
SCHOOL 0,0653 *** 0,0666 *** 0,0625 *** 0,0605 *** 0,0615 *** 0,0609 *** 0,0629 *** 0,0652 *** 0,0745 ***
EXPERIENCE 0,0203 *** 0,0197 *** 0,0192 *** 0,0186 *** 0,0156 *** 0,0154 *** 0,0128 *** 0,0135 *** 0,0080 *
EXPERIENCE^2 -0,0002 *** -0,0002 *** -0,0002 *** -0,0002 *** -0,0002 ** -0,0001 ** -0,0001 -0,0001 0,0000
DUMMY_MALE 0,1124 *** 0,1067 *** 0,1112 *** 0,1169 *** 0,1287 *** 0,1187 *** 0,1178 *** 0,1454 *** 0,1522 ***
DUMMY_MARRIED 0,0104 0,0124 0,0044 -0,0084 -0,0176 -0,0143 0,0025 -0,0042 0,0084
NCOMP 0,0018 0,0083 0,0115 * 0,0080 0,0093 0,0143 ** 0,0118 * 0,0161 * 0,0098
DUMMY_HOUSEHOLD 0,0032 0,0109 0,0157 -0,0020 -0,0116 -0,0076 -0,0096 -0,0236 -0,0047
DUMMY_TOWN 0,0035 0,0085 -0,0133 0,0185 0,0061 0,0153 0,0105 -0,0094 -0,0182
DUMMY_NORTH 0,0500 ** 0,0491 *** 0,0407 *** 0,0431 *** 0,0459 *** 0,0479 *** 0,0332 * 0,0298 0,0178
DUMMY_SOUTH -0,0215 -0,0036 -0,0033 0,0152 0,0129 0,0194 0,0265 0,0049 0,0132
DUMMY_AGRICULTURAL -0,2705 *** -0,1006 -0,0478 -0,0538 -0,0414 -0,0394 -0,0374 0,0327 0,0588
DUMMY_PUBLIC 0,0619 ** 0,0458 * 0,0527 ** 0,0497 ** 0,0521 *** 0,0583 *** 0,0612 *** 0,0764 *** 0,0357
DUMMY_OTHER_SECTOR -0,0171 -0,0190 -0,0108 -0,0107 0,0003 0,0016 0,0119 0,0354 0,0002
DUMMY_SECT_PARENTS 0,0249 0,0077 0,0095 -0,0033 -0,0063 -0,0036 -0,0071 -0,0182 0,0033
DUMMY_PART_TIME -0,1023 0,0022 -0,0112 0,0011 0,0117 0,0203 0,0211 0,0252 0,0876
Constant 0,8257 *** 0,9321 *** 1,0655 *** 1,1908 *** 1,2678 *** 1,3136 *** 1,3941 *** 1,4517 *** 1,5753 ***
Year 2004
0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9
SCHOOL 0,0553 *** 0,0579 *** 0,0560 *** 0,0614 *** 0,0654 *** 0,0711 *** 0,0731 *** 0,0792 *** 0,0838 ***
EXPERIENCE 0,0259 *** 0,0247 *** 0,0201 *** 0,0200 *** 0,0178 *** 0,0178 *** 0,0186 *** 0,0125 *** 0,0152 ***
EXPERIENCE^2 -0,0004 *** -0,0004 *** -0,0002 *** -0,0002 *** -0,0002 *** -0,0002 *** -0,0002 *** -0,0001 -0,0001
DUMMY_MALE 0,1149 *** 0,1086 *** 0,1041 *** 0,1132 *** 0,1182 *** 0,1098 *** 0,1202 *** 0,1137 *** 0,1141 ***
DUMMY_MARRIED 0,0259 0,0083 0,0250 0,0164 0,0141 0,0182 0,0205 0,0112 0,0235
NCOMP 0,0024 0,0144 ** 0,0161 ** 0,0154 ** 0,0174 *** 0,0190 *** 0,0246 *** 0,0286 *** 0,0376 ***
DUMMY_HOUSEHOLD 0,0214 0,0090 0,0171 0,0142 0,0180 0,0226 0,0299 * 0,0380 * 0,0359
DUMMY_TOWN 0,0542 ** 0,0259 0,0153 0,0062 0,0174 0,0158 0,0044 0,0030 -0,0307
DUMMY_NORTH 0,0100 0,0318 * 0,0224 0,0153 0,0048 0,0257 0,0031 -0,0123 -0,0245
DUMMY_SOUTH -0,0908 *** -0,0529 ** -0,0490 ** -0,0212 -0,0059 0,0124 -0,0089 -0,0184 -0,0017
DUMMY_AGRICULTURAL -0,2067 *** -0,1551 *** -0,1166 *** -0,1278 *** -0,1137 *** -0,0685 -0,0391 -0,0124 0,0804
DUMMY_PUBLIC 0,0488 0,0451 ** 0,0583 *** 0,0418 ** 0,0348 * 0,0333 0,0457 * 0,0343 0,0453
DUMMY_OTHER_SECTOR -0,0489 ** -0,0262 -0,0034 0,0015 0,0127 0,0069 0,0216 0,0252 0,0312
DUMMY_SECT_PARENTS -0,0185 -0,0071 -0,0048 -0,0160 -0,0032 -0,0106 -0,0040 -0,0269 * -0,0296
DUMMY_PART_TIME -0,0762 * -0,0542 ** -0,0498 * -0,0238 -0,0189 -0,0182 -0,0235 -0,0007 0,0544
Constant 0,9727 *** 1,0226 *** 1,1388 *** 1,1658 *** 1,1890 *** 1,1731 *** 1,1994 *** 1,2896 *** 1,3068 ***
Year 2006
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0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9
SCHOOL 0,0513 *** 0,0463 *** 0,0565 *** 0,0619 *** 0,0626 *** 0,0673 *** 0,0684 *** 0,0712 *** 0,0754 ***
EXPERIENCE 0,0200 *** 0,0239 *** 0,0229 *** 0,0203 *** 0,0205 *** 0,0173 *** 0,0138 *** 0,0125 *** 0,0139 ***
EXPERIENCE^2 -0,0002 *** -0,0003 *** -0,0003 *** -0,0002 *** -0,0002 *** -0,0002 ** -0,0001 0,0000 -0,0001
DUMMY_MALE 0,0992 *** 0,1121 *** 0,1128 *** 0,1127 *** 0,1258 *** 0,1535 *** 0,1552 *** 0,1555 *** 0,1679 ***
DUMMY_MARRIED -0,0219 -0,0025 -0,0082 -0,0121 -0,0298 -0,0456 ** -0,0348 -0,0251 -0,0285
NCOMP 0,0256 *** 0,0132 ** 0,0170 ** 0,0153 ** 0,0224 *** 0,0276 *** 0,0285 *** 0,0313 *** 0,0326 **
DUMMY_HOUSEHOLD 0,0483 * 0,0237 0,0322 * 0,0189 0,0086 0,0002 0,0051 -0,0105 -0,0183
DUMMY_TOWN -0,0025 -0,0244 0,0041 0,0163 0,0429 * 0,0335 0,0323 0,0152 0,0176
DUMMY_NORTH 0,0438 ** 0,0291 0,0120 0,0030 0,0013 -0,0248 -0,0330 -0,0492 ** -0,0777 **
DUMMY_SOUTH -0,0302 -0,0206 -0,0109 0,0096 0,0170 0,0067 0,0015 0,0036 -0,0406
DUMMY_AGRICULTURAL -0,1714 ** -0,1347 ** -0,1021 ** -0,0744 -0,0724 * -0,1195 *** -0,1010 ** -0,0996 * -0,0154
DUMMY_PUBLIC 0,0669 * 0,0683 *** 0,0439 * 0,0235 0,0386 0,0321 0,0364 0,0534 * 0,0511
DUMMY_OTHER_SECTOR -0,0547 ** -0,0373 ** -0,0223 -0,0261 -0,0175 -0,0175 -0,0296 -0,0059 0,0025
DUMMY_SECT_PARENTS 0,0222 0,0145 0,0169 0,0070 0,0157 0,0150 0,0086 0,0151 0,0356
DUMMY_PART_TIME -0,0351 -0,0024 0,0257 0,0438 0,0511 * 0,0781 *** 0,1021 *** 0,1250 *** 0,1102 **
Constant 0,9444 *** 1,1248 *** 1,0744 *** 1,1214 *** 1,1532 *** 1,2101 *** 1,2963 *** 1,3588 *** 1,4575 ***
Year 2008
0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9
SCHOOL 0,0502 *** 0,0433 *** 0,0454 *** 0,0632 *** 0,0564 *** 0,0567 *** 0,0666 *** 0,0777 *** 0,0852 ***
EXPERIENCE 0,0268 *** 0,0201 *** 0,0161 *** 0,0185 *** 0,0162 *** 0,0145 *** 0,0126 *** 0,0081 * -0,0013
EXPERIENCE^2 -0,0004 *** -0,0003 *** -0,0002 ** -0,0002 ** -0,0001 * -0,0001 0,0000 0,0001 0,0003 *
DUMMY_MALE 0,1290 *** 0,1144 *** 0,1289 *** 0,1532 *** 0,1536 *** 0,1455 *** 0,1578 *** 0,1649 *** 0,1663 ***
DUMMY_MARRIED -0,0301 -0,0196 -0,0221 -0,0156 -0,0039 0,0004 -0,0067 0,0188 -0,0212
NCOMP 0,0265 *** 0,0181 ** 0,0169 ** 0,0146 * 0,0131 * 0,0155 * 0,0158 * 0,0135 0,0275 **
DUMMY_TOWN 0,0189 0,0626 ** 0,0650 *** 0,0499 * 0,0826 *** 0,0593 ** 0,0704 *** 0,0414 -0,0062
DUMMY_NORTH 0,0626 ** 0,0443 ** 0,0494 *** 0,0532 *** 0,0138 0,0129 0,0176 0,0116 -0,0163
DUMMY_SOUTH 0,0137 0,0145 0,0231 0,0225 0,0130 0,0139 0,0312 0,0229 0,0078
DUMMY_AGRICULTURAL -0,2385 *** -0,2334 *** -0,1628 * -0,0731 * -0,1095 *** -0,1140 ** -0,1034 * -0,1242 * 0,0195
DUMMY_PUBLIC 0,0437 0,0800 *** 0,0892 *** 0,0469 * 0,0641 ** 0,0666 ** 0,0424 0,0230 0,0273
DUMMY_OTHER_SECTOR -0,0415 * -0,0206 -0,0104 -0,0125 -0,0008 0,0107 0,0035 -0,0166 0,0158
DUMMY_SECT_PARENTS 0,0162 0,0092 0,0200 0,0132 0,0049 0,0157 0,0136 0,0129 -0,0113
DUMMY_PART_TIME -0,0423 -0,0601 * -0,0173 0,0049 0,0298 0,0184 0,0158 0,0561 0,0175
Constant 0,9201 *** 1,1953 *** 1,2302 *** 1,0599 *** 1,2187 *** 1,2832 *** 1,2611 *** 1,2874 *** 1,4307 ***
Year 2010
0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9
SCHOOL 0,0488 *** 0,0542 *** 0,0530 *** 0,0593 *** 0,0630 *** 0,0630 *** 0,0648 *** 0,0738 *** 0,0771 ***
EXPERIENCE 0,0332 *** 0,0289 *** 0,0241 *** 0,0218 *** 0,0218 *** 0,0192 *** 0,0208 *** 0,0165 *** 0,0102
EXPERIENCE^2 -0,0005 *** -0,0004 *** -0,0003 *** -0,0002 *** -0,0002 ** -0,0002 * -0,0002 ** -0,0001 0,0000
DUMMY_MALE 0,1366 *** 0,1208 *** 0,1080 *** 0,1270 *** 0,1162 *** 0,1115 *** 0,1099 *** 0,0989 *** 0,1345 ***
DUMMY_MARRIED 0,0469 0,0126 0,0159 -0,0038 0,0052 0,0046 0,0066 -0,0284 -0,0535
NCOMP -0,0008 0,0087 0,0180 ** 0,0256 *** 0,0270 *** 0,0307 *** 0,0320 *** 0,0449 *** 0,0520 ***
DUMMY_TOWN -0,0746 -0,0359 -0,0281 -0,0261 -0,0046 -0,0260 0,0140 0,0157 0,0152
DUMMY_NORTH 0,0540 * 0,0401 * 0,0340 * 0,0623 *** 0,0563 *** 0,0431 * 0,0294 -0,0079 -0,0278
DUMMY_SOUTH -0,0057 -0,0199 -0,0080 0,0265 0,0298 0,0336 0,0480 * 0,0255 -0,0177
DUMMY_AGRICULTURAL -0,1481 *** -0,1867 *** -0,1975 *** -0,1881 *** -0,1758 *** -0,1328 ** -0,1153 ** -0,1112 ** -0,1284
DUMMY_PUBLIC 0,0283 0,0474 0,0333 0,0212 0,0254 0,0235 0,0167 -0,0133 0,0222
DUMMY_OTHER_SECTOR -0,0639 ** -0,0239 -0,0162 -0,0329 -0,0211 -0,0302 -0,0199 -0,0128 0,0424
DUMMY_SECT_PARENTS 0,0318 0,0183 0,0165 0,0159 0,0118 0,0281 0,0255 -0,0181 -0,0053
DUMMY_PART_TIME -0,1156 ** -0,0727 ** -0,0641 ** -0,0494 * -0,0389 -0,0183 -0,0048 -0,0144 0,0384
Constant 0,8023 *** 0,8794 *** 1,0093 *** 0,9822 *** 1,0008 *** 1,1028 *** 1,1346 *** 1,2214 *** 1,3513 ***
Year 2012
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